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John Marshall And Felix Frankfurter: An Icon And A Disappointment?, William E. Nelson

Touro Law Review

This article shows how Chief Justice John Marshall first developed the doctrine of judicial restraint in Marbury v. Madison to assure the public that the Supreme Court would not engage in politically oriented judicial review as colonial courts had in holding Parliament’s 1765 Stamp Act unconstitutional. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in contrast, adopted judicial restraint differently—by reading the scholarship of James Bradley Thayer. This article also shows that Frankfurter did not abandon his commitment to judicial restraint when during his years on the bench it began to serve conservative purposes rather than the progressive purposes it had once served.

Lost In The Thicket, Brad Snyder

Touro Law Review

As part of a symposium on his biography of Felix Frankfurter, Democratic Justice, Brad Snyder revisits Baker v. Carr and explores the contrasts between Justice William Brennan’s judicially supremacist majority opinion and Frankfurter’s departmentalist dissent and unheeded warnings about empowering the judiciary. As Frankfurter wrote in his Baker dissent, he placed more faith in the U.S. Congress, as opposed to the judiciary, to protect democracy.

Abortion And Affirmative Action: The Fragility Of Supreme Court Political Decision-Making, William E. Nelson

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

This Article shows, on the basis of new evidence, that the canonical case of Marbury v. Madison has been grossly misinterpreted and that as a result of the misinterpretation we cannot understand what is wrong with contemporary cases such as Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.

The Article will proceed as follows. Because Marbury cannot be properly understood without understanding the eighteenth-century background against which it was decided, Part I will examine legal practices in colonial and post-Revolutionary America, focusing on cases in which judicial review emerged …

Justice Scalia And The Demise Of Environmental Law Standing, Patti A. Meeks

Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law

No abstract provided.

At What Is The Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?, R. George Wright

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marbury's Legacy Of Judicial Review After Two Centuries, Harry F. Tepker

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Michigan Law Review

Nearly all of American constitutional law today rests on a myth. The myth, presented as standard history both in junior high civics texts and in advanced law school courses on constitutional law, runs something like this: A long, long time ago - 1803, if the storyteller is trying to be precise - in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court of the United States created the doctrine of "judicial review." Judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to decide the meaning of the Constitution and to strike down laws that the Court finds unconstitutional. As …

Comparative Constitutionalism In A New Key, Paul W. Kahn

Michigan Law Review

Law is a symbolic system that structures the political imagination. The "rule of law" is a shorthand expression for a cultural practice that constructs a particular understanding of time and space, of subjects and groups, as well as of authority and legitimacy. It is a way of projecting, maintaining, and discovering meaning in the world of historical events and political possibilities. The rule of law - as opposed to the techniques of lawyering - is not the possession of lawyers. It is a characterization of the polity, which operates both descriptively and normatively in public perception. Ours, we believe, is …

Foreword: A Silk Purse?, John T. Noonan Jr.

Michigan Law Review

On March 2, 1801, President John Adams appointed forty-two persons to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. John Marshall, doubling as Secretary of State as well as Chief Justice, failed to deliver the commissions. Adams's term expired. James Madison, Marshall's successor as Secretary of State, withheld seventeen of the commissions. In 1802, William Marbury and three other appointees to this minor office brought mandamus against Madison in the Supreme Court. Madison was ordered to show cause why the writ should not issue. Congress abolished the June sitting of the Court. Only in 1803 was the case …

Judging The Next Emergency: Judicial Review And Individual Rights In Times Of Crisis, David Cole

Michigan Law Review

As virtually every law student who studies Marbury v. Madison learns, Chief Justice John Marshall's tactical genius was to establish judicial review in a case where the result could not be challenged. As a technical matter, Marbury lost, and the executive branch won. As furious as President Jefferson reportedly was with the decision, there was nothing he could do about it, for there was no mandate to defy. The Court's decision offered no remedy for Marbury himself, whose rights were directly at issue, and whose rights the Court found had indeed been violated. But over time, it became clear that …

Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark Tushnet

Michigan Law Review

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …

If History Mattered: John Marshall And Reframing The Constitution, Aviam Soifer

Michigan Law Review

What more can there be to learn about John Marshall? We have been blessed recently with a flood of fine books about Marshall and the Supreme Court over which he presided from 1801 until 1835. We also now have readily available an impressive collection of documents concerning the Court before Marshall, as well as a fine series collecting, introducing, and annotating Marshall's papers. With recent bicentennial celebrations marking the beginning of Marshall's career as Chief Justice and the anniversary of Marbury v. Madison, an outpouring of law review articles and scholarly symposia have offered learned exchanges about the great Chief …

Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes cancer" in human beings or animals. Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were …

Dissing Congress, Ruth Colker, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent leadership has invalidated numerous federal laws, arguably departing from settled precedent to do so. The Rehnquist Court has held that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in five instances during the 2000-01 Term, on four occasions during the 1999-2000 Term and in a total of twenty-nine cases since the 1994-95 Term. Commentators typically explain these decisions in federalism terms, focusing on the Court's use of its power to protect the States from an overreaching Congress. That explanation is incomplete and, in important respects, unpersuasive. The Rehnquist Court has not been as solicitous of …

How To Apply The Religious Freedom Restoration Act To Federal Law Without Violating The Constitution, Gregory P. Magarian

Michigan Law Review

Learned commentators have called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA" or "the Act") "perhaps the most unconstitutional statute in the history of the nation" and "the most egregious violation of the separation of powers doctrine in American constitutional history." In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down the Act in its applications to state and local governments, declaring that "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance." The Act's applications to federal law, however, survived Boerne, which means that plaintiffs with religious freedom claims against …

Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, Erwin Chemerinsky

Michigan Law Review

In the last decade, it has become increasingly trendy to question whether the Supreme Court and constitutional judicial review really can make a difference. Gerald Rosenberg, for example, in The Hollow Hope, expressly questions whether judicial review achieves effective social change. Similarly, Michael Klarman explores whether the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions were effective, except insofar as they produced a right-wing backlash that induced action to desegregate. In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Mark Tushnet approvingly invokes these arguments (pp. 137, 145), but he goes much further. Professor Tushnet contends that, on balance, constitutional judicial review is harmful. He …

The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, Neal Devins

Michigan Law Review

During my freshman year in college, I was told not to judge a book by its cover. The book in question - Lolita; the cover suggested something quite salacious. My professor explained that a soldier, who had purchased Lolita to work out some of the kinks of military life, found himself tossing the book out, proclaiming in disgust "Literature!" Well, I cannot claim precisely the same reaction to Cass Sunstein's One Case at a Time (my expectations were lower than the soldier's). Nevertheless, for those expecting a lefty defense of judicial restraint, One Case at a Time is not your …

The Supreme Court's Role: Guarantor Of Individual And Minority Group Rights, Nadine Strossen

University of Richmond Law Review

We have just celebrated the Bicentennial of the United States Bill of Rights, a marvelous document that not only has been used to secure a broad range of freedoms for many people in this country, but also has inspired and served as a model for liberty-loving peoples the world over. However, the freedoms enunciated in the Bill of Rights - as well as in other Constitutional provisions - are not self-enforcing.

The Role Of The Modern Supreme Court, Ronald D. Rotunda

University of Richmond Law Review

In The FederalistNo. 78, Alexander Hamilton examined the judicial department. He relied on that branch to safeguard the limitations drafted into the Constitution. While the judiciary is "incontestably" and "beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power," he conceded, nonetheless, the constitutional limitations on legislative excess "can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void."

Pure Politics, Girardeau A. Spann

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article considers the impact that judicial discretion has on the traditional model of judicial review, and that model's reliance on the Supreme Court as the primary guardian of minority interests. Part II argues that the interests of racial minorities can be better advanced through the ordinary political process than through the process of Supreme Court adjudication. Part Ill emphasizes that minority participation in Supreme Court proceedings cannot ultimately be avoided and, accordingly, suggests a political model of the Court that minorities can use in an effort to neutralize the Court's distortion of the political process. Part …

Mr. Justice Powell's Standing, Gary C. Leedes

University of Richmond Law Review

Some may lament the results of Mr. Justice Powell's attempts to clarify the law of standing. Indeed, public interest lawyers who advocate granting standing on a surrogate basis to individuals who are members of a large unorganized class of diffuse interests have cause to complain about a return to a more orthodox conception of standing. However, Mr. Justice Powell has a different outlook, viz., in a democratic society, a federal court is not necessarily an appropriate or the most effective institution to redress the grievances of people upset by alleged lawless government action.

Hyneman: The Supreme Court On Trial, William W. Van Alstyne

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Supreme Court on Trial. By Charles S. Hyneman

Marbury V Madison And The Doctrine Of Judical Review, Edward S. Corwin

Michigan Law Review

What is the exact legal basis of the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress? Recent literature on the subject reveals a considerable variety of opinion. There are radicals who hold that the power owes its existence to an act of sheer usurpation by the Supreme Court itself, in the decision of Marbury v. Madison. There are conservatives who point to clauses of the Constitution which, they assure us, specifically confer the power. There are legists who refuse to go back of Marbury v. Madison, content in the ratification which, they assert, subsequent …

Supreme Court And Unconstitutional Acts Of Congress, Edwin S. Corwin

Michigan Law Review

The power of the Supreme Court of the United States to supervise Congressional legislation has been so generally assumed in the recent discussions, both in and out of Congress, of the proposed Rate Bill, and is indeed so apparently settled today that it becomes of interest to inquire into the intention of the Constitutional Fathers in this matter. Did the Fathers intend that the federal judiciary should have the right to declare an act of Congress of no effect because transgressing constitutional limits? It does not detract from the interest of this question that two recent authorities who attempt to …