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Complementarity And Custom In Wage Contract Violation, John S. Earle, Klara Sabirianova Peter
Complementarity And Custom In Wage Contract Violation, John S. Earle, Klara Sabirianova Peter
Upjohn Institute Working Papers
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The model is estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identification through fixed effects for employees, employers, and local labor markets, and instrumental variables based on policy interventions. The estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimated feedback loops - worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties - imply that costs of wage delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case …