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Jobs For Justice(S): Corruption In The Supreme Court Of India, Madhav S. Aney, Shubhankar Dam, Giovanni Ko
Jobs For Justice(S): Corruption In The Supreme Court Of India, Madhav S. Aney, Shubhankar Dam, Giovanni Ko
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate whether judicial decisions are affected by career concerns of judges by analyzing two questions: Do judges respond to incentives to pander by ruling in favor of the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Supreme Court? Does the government reward judges who rule in its favor with prestigious jobs? We construct a data set of Supreme Court of India cases involving the government for 1999–2014. We find that incentives to pander have a causal effect on judicial decision-making, and they are jointly determined by the importance of the case and whether the judge retires …
Group Reputation, Anonymous Matching, And External Monitoring In A Model Of Corruption, Huan Wang, Yi Zhang
Group Reputation, Anonymous Matching, And External Monitoring In A Model Of Corruption, Huan Wang, Yi Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
We explore what group reputation is and model its formation and evolution. Based solely on group signals, we define a player’s group reputation as the belief that others have about the characteristics of the group the player belongs to. A model of group reputation of civil servants with anonymous matching and external monitoring is constructed to characterize the strategic behavior of potential bribers and civil servants, the corresponding levels of corruption, possible anti-corruption policies, and the effects of these policies. Our results indicate that as there are two types of corruption behavior of civil servants: accepting bribes and dereliction of …
Instability And The Incentives For Corruption, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor, Quoc-Anh Do
Instability And The Incentives For Corruption, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor, Quoc-Anh Do
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand effect, by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, because firms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these …