Digital Commons Network^™

Covid-19 Risk Factors And Boilerplate Disclosure, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Xuan Liu, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

The SEC mandates that public companies assess new information that changes the risks that they face and disclose these if there has been a “material” change. Does that theory work in practice? Or are companies copying and repeating the same generic disclosures? Using the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore these questions. Overall, we find considerable rote copying of boilerplate disclosures. Further, the factors that correlate with deviations from the boilerplate seem related more to the resources that companies have (large companies change updated disclosures more) and litigation risks (companies vulnerable to shareholder litigation update more) rather than general …

Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

We examine the effects of the sudden abolition of trading commissions by major online brokerages in 2019, which lowered stock market entry costs for retail investors, on corporate governance. Firms already popular with retail investors experienced positive abnormal returns around the abolition of commissions. Firms with positive abnormal returns in response to commission-free trading subsequently saw a decrease in institutional ownership, a decrease in shareholder voting, and a deterioration in environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) metrics. Finally, these firms were more likely to adopt bylaw amendments to reduce the percentage of shares needed for a quorum at shareholder meetings. …

Tying Law For The Digital Age, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Tying arrangements, a central concern of antitrust policy since the early days of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, have come into renewed focus with re-spect to the practices of dominant technology companies. Unfortunately, tying law’s doctrinal structure is a self-contradictory and incoherent wreck. A con-ventional view holds that this mess is due to errant Supreme Court precedents, never fully corrected, that expressed hostility to tying based on faulty economic understanding. That is only part of the story. Examination of tying law’s origins and development shows that tying doctrine was built on a now-dated paradigm of what constitutes a tying arrangement. …

Pricing Corporate Governance, Albert Choi

Articles

Scholars and practitioners have long theorized that by penalizing firms with unattractive governance features, the stock market incentivizes firms to adopt the optimal governance structure at their initial public offerings (IPOs). This theory, however, does not seem to match with practice. Not only do many IPO firms offer putatively suboptimal governance arrangements, such as staggered boards and dual-class structures, but these arrangements have been gaining popularity among IPO firms. This Article argues that the IPO market is unlikely to provide the necessary discipline to incentivize companies to adopt the optimal governance package. In particular, when the optimal governance package differs …

The Business Of Securities Class Action Lawyering, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States play a key role in combating corporate fraud. Shareholders who lose money as a result of fraud can file securities class actions to recover their losses, but most shareholders do not have enough money at stake to justify overseeing the cases filed on their behalf. As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers control these cases, deciding which cases to file and how to litigate them. Recognizing the agency costs inherent in this model, the legal system relies on lead plaintiffs and judges to monitor these lawyers and protect the best interests of absent class members. Yet …

Meme Corporate Governance, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

Can retail investors revolutionize corporate governance and make public companies more responsive to social concerns? The U.S. stock market offered an unusual experiment to test the impact of retail investors in 2021, when there was a dramatic influx of retail investors into the shareholder base of companies such as GameStop and AMC. The meme surge phenomenon elicited a variety of reactions from scholars and practitioners. While some worried that affected companies’ share prices were becoming disjointed from their financial fundamentals, others predicted that retail shareholders will reduce the power of large institutional investors and democratize corporate governance. This Article presents …

The Securities Law Disclosure Conundrum For Publicly Traded Litigation Finance Companies, Robert F. Weber

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The Article examines a peculiar legal dilemma—implicating securities law, legal ethics, and evidence law—that arises when litigation finance companies (LFCs) become public companies. LFCs provide funding to litigants and law firms for prosecuting lawsuits in exchange for a share of the lawsuit recoveries. In recent years, LFCs have significantly altered the landscape of the civil justice system in common law jurisdictions. But their assets, which are just rights to proceeds from lawsuits, are notoriously opaque— who really can predict what a jury will do when it comes to liability and damages? When LFCs go public, this opacity frustrates public investors’ …

All Stick And No Carrot? Reforming Public Offerings, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

The SEC heavily regulates the traditional initial public offering. Those regulatory burdens fuel interest in alternative paths for private companies to go public, “regulatory arbitrage.” The SEC’s response to the emergence of alternatives, most recently SPACs and direct listings, has been to suppress them by imposing heightened liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. The SEC’s treatment of the traditional IPO regulatory process as a one-size-fits-all regime ignores the weaknesses of this process, in particular the informational inefficiency of the book-building process. In this essay we argue that the agency’s focus in regulating issuers going public should be on …

Why Do Corporations Merge And Why Should Law Care?, Chris Sagers

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Mergers and acquisitions are extraordinarily prevalent in the United States, generating massive expenditures every year. However, a serious empirical puzzle lies at the heart of all that activity. That empirical phenomenon’s most remarkable feature by far is that even though it is well established in an extensive literature and implies far-reaching policy consequences, American law ignores it entirely.

Generations of researchers have failed to find evidence that merger and acquisition activity generates any lasting benefits for the combining firms’ owners or anyone else. No one seriously doubts that efficiencies of scale or technological integration are real or that acquisitions sometimes …

Legal Guardrails For A Unicorn Crackdown, Alexander I. Platt

Michigan Law Review Online

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is undertaking a historic effort to redraw the boundary between public and private companies. After years of watching—and sometimes encouraging—the explosive growth in less tightly regulated private markets and the proliferation of so-called “unicorns,” the agency is now reasserting its authority.

A key arrow in the agency’s regulatory quiver is its authority under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to force private companies to “go public” when they reach a certain size. The provision requires any company whose shares are “held of record” by more than 2,000 persons to …

Giving Shareholders The Right To Say No, Albert H. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

When a public company releases misleading information that distorts the market for the company’s stock, investors who purchase at the inflated price lose money when (and if) the misleading information is later corrected. Under Rule 10b‑5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investors can seek compensation from corporations and their officers who make materially misleading statements that the investors relied on when buying or selling a security. Compensation is the obvious goal, but the threat of lawsuits can also benefit investors by deterring managers from committing fraud.

Closing The Auditor Loophole: Towards A More Perfect Work-Product Waiver Doctrine, Evan Mulbry

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The Supreme Court created strong protections for the attorney’s thought processes and analysis in Hickman v. Taylor. However, the Court in Arthur Young & Co. created a loophole enabling opposing lawyers to access the lawyer’s thought processes and legal strategies. This loophole was created when the Court allowed discovery of an auditor’s tax workpapers, and lower courts then interpreted this decision to imply that disclosing information to the outside auditor constitutes a waiver of attorney work-product protections. This loophole can be corrected through a Congressional statute that impacts the Federal Rules of Evidence, which would protect communications between outside auditors …

Just Say No? Shareholder Voting On Securities Class Actions, Albert H. Choi, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The U.S. securities laws allow security-holders to bring a class action suit against a public company and its officers who make materially misleading statements to the market. The class action mechanism allows individual claimants to aggregate their claims. This procedure mitigates the collective action problem among claimants, and also creates potential economies of scale. Despite these efficiencies, the class action mechanism has been criticized for being driven by attorneys and also encouraging nuisance suits. Although various statutory and doctrinal solutions have been proposed and implemented over the years, the concerns over the agency problem and nuisance suits persist. This paper …

Initial Public Offering And Optimal Corporate Governance, Albert H. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper examines the long-standing debate over whether firms have a market-based incentive to adopt optimal governance provisions at their initial public offering (IPO). Various scholars and practitioners have argued that firms that offer stock to the public with suboptimal governance structure will be penalized by the market through a lower IPO price. At the same time, others have documented empirical evidence that many IPO firms have putatively suboptimal governance provisions, such as anti-takeover provisions and dual class structure, and many, especially those with dual-class structure, enjoy a market premium at their IPO. This paper attempts to bridge this gap. …

The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel V. Rauterberg

Law & Economics Working Papers

This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …

Shareholder Engagement In The United States, Vikramaditya S. Khanna

Book Chapters

Shareholder voting and engagement in the US have undergone substantial changes over the last 50 years. They have moved from being relatively sleepy issues to those that trigger insomnia in even the most hardened executives. The changes in the ownership structure of US publicly traded firms are probably the most important reason for the shift, but so too are rule changes that have facilitated greater shareholder activism. This chapter explores these developments while describing the rules of the road for shareholder voting in the US by focusing on Delaware jurisprudence and changes in US federal securities regulations. It also examines …

Do Esg Funds Deliver On Their Promises?, Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch, Adriana Z. Robertson

Michigan Law Review

Corporations have received growing criticism for contributing to climate change, perpetuating racial and gender inequality, and failing to address other pressing social issues. In response to these concerns, shareholders are increasingly focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria in selecting investments, and asset managers are responding by offering a growing number of ESG mutual funds. The flow of assets into ESG is one of the most dramatic trends in asset management.

But are these funds giving investors what they promise? This question has attracted the attention of regulators, with the Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange …

Board Diversity Shareholder Suits: Diverging Materiality Tests Under Rules 10b-5 And 14a-9, John C. Friess

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing has grown significantly as an investment strategy over the past decade, leading to intensified demands among investors for more ESG disclosures from publicly listed companies. Perhaps the most high-profile example of this trend is the recent widespread demand among institutional investors, proxy advisory firms, and exchanges for more disclosure and compliance as it relates to board and workplace diversity. Given these efforts and the signals coming from the SEC that it intends to take a more proactive approach to ESG disclosure and compliance, issuers can expect an environment of more specific and detailed diversity …

The Future Of Securities Law In The Supreme Court, Adam C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson

Articles

Since the enactment of the first federal securities statute in 1933, securities law has illustrated key shifts in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. During the New Deal, the Court’s securities law decisions shifted almost overnight from open hostility toward the newly-expanded administrative state to broad deference to agency expertise. In the 1940s, securities cases helped build the legal foundation for a broadly enabling administrative law. The 1960s saw the Warren Court creating new implied rights of action in securities law illustrative of the Court’s approach to statutes generally. The stage seemed set for the rise of “federal corporate law.” The Court …

A Historical Analysis Of The Investment Company Act Of 1940, Michael B. Weiner

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

More than 100 million Americans invest $25 trillion in mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (collectively, “funds”) regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”), making funds the predominant investment vehicle in the United States. Everyday investors rely on funds to save for retirement, pay for college, and seek financial security. In this way, funds demonstrate how “Wall Street” can connect with “Main Street” to improve people’s lives.

By way of background, funds are created by investment advisers (“advisers”) that provide investment advisory (e.g., stock selection) and other services to their funds in exchange for a fee. …

Equity Market Structure Regulation: Time To Start Over, Paul G. Mahoney

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Over the past half-century, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s regulations have become key determinants of the way in which stocks trade and the fees that exchanges charge for their services. The current equity market structure rules are contained primarily in the SEC’s Regulation NMS. The theory behind Regulation NMS is that a system of dispersed markets operating pursuant to SEC-mandated information and order routing links will provide the benefits of consolidation and competition simultaneously.

This article argues that Regulation NMS has failed in that quest. It has produced fragmented markets and created questionable incentives for market participants, possibly …

The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel Rauterberg

Articles

This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …

Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corporations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doctrine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and bylaw provisions …

Working Hard Or Making Work? Plaintiffs' Attorneys Fees In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, A. C. Pritchard

Articles

In this article, we study attorney fees awarded in the largest securities class actions: “mega- settlements.” Consistent with prior work, we find larger fee awards but lower percentages in these cases. We also find that courts are more likely to reject or modify fee requests made in connection with the largest settlements. We conjecture that this scrutiny provides an incentive for law firms to bill more hours, not to advance the case, but to help justify large fee awards—“make work.” The results of our empirical tests are consistent with plaintiffs’ attorneys investing more time in litigation against larger companies, with …

Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Ofer Eldar

Articles

A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corpo- rations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Secur- ities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doc- trine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter …

The Proxy Problem: Using Nonprofits To Solve Misaligned Incentives In The Proxy Voting Process, Leah Duncan

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Proxy advisory firms and their influence on the proxy voting process have recently become the subject of great attention for the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) among other constituencies. A glance at recent proxy season recaps and reports, many of which devote space to discussing proxy advisory firm recommendations, reveal the significance of this influence on institutional voting. As Sagiv Edelman puts it, “proxy advisory firms exist at the nexus of some of the most high-profile corporate law discussions—most notably, the shareholder voting process, which has recently been the subject of much scholarly and legal debate.” The SEC has responded …

Redefining Accredited Investor: That's One Small Step For The Sec, One Giant Leap For Our Economy, Jeff Thomas

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

It may sound trivial, yet how we define accredited investor (AI) is critical. Among other things, U.S. securities laws and regulations make it easier for AIs to invest in privately held companies through “exempt offerings,” which are offerings not “registered” under the 1933 Securities Act. This results in AIs having investment opportunities that are unavailable to non-accredited investors (non-AIs). Moreover, the amount raised in exempt offerings has been increasing both absolutely and relative to the amount raised in registered offerings. In fact, the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance recently indicated that “[c]ompanies raised $2.9 trillion in private …

Gatekeeping The Gatekeepers: The Need For A Licensing Requirement For Crowdfunding Portals In The Wake Of The Dreamfunded Decision, Nick Worden

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Most people are familiar with crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter and GoFundMe—sites that allow users to part with their money in exchange for products or donate their capital to organizations they believe in. However, these sites have one trait in common: they do not offer contributors equity or a promise for future profits. For a long time, selling equity meant complying with the costly requirements of federal securities laws, which was cost-prohibitive for many small businesses; it was illegal for businesses to offer equity over a site in the way businesses on Kickstarter offered products. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups …

From Inactivity To Full Enforcement: The Implementation Of The "Do No Harm" Approach In Initial Coin Offerings, Marco Dell'erba

Michigan Technology Law Review

This Article analyzes the way the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has enforced securities laws with regard to Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”). In a speech held in 2016, the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) Chairman Christopher Giancarlo emphasized the similarities between the advent of the blockchain technology and the Internet era. He offered the “do no harm” approach as the best way to regulate blockchain technology. The Clinton administration implemented the “do no harm” approach at the beginning of the Internet Era in the 1990s when regulators sought to support technological innovations without stifling them with burdensome rules.

This …

Strengthening The Passivity Default, Ian Ayres, Edward Fox

Articles

In The Prudence of Passivity, Bryon Harmon and Laura Fisher (hereafter HF) argue that "passive management become the default approach for the investment of trust funds, to be abandoned only when circumstances specifically dictate the use of active management."' In this comment we argue that their thesis could be strengthened (i) by more clearly distinguishing between default law and default investment practices, (ii) by more clearly articulating their favored altering rules.