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Testimony On Broadband To Senate Committee On Small Business And Entrepreneurship, Scott J. Wallsten
Testimony On Broadband To Senate Committee On Small Business And Entrepreneurship, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
Monopoly Rights In The Privatization Of Telephone Firms, Bruno E. Viani
Monopoly Rights In The Privatization Of Telephone Firms, Bruno E. Viani
Bruno E. Viani
Data from utility privatization sales in 74 countries is analyzed to investigate why governments award monopoly rights, and how monopoly affects government revenue from these sales. Financially constrained governments are more likely to award monopoly rights. Interest groups and institutions are important. Increased importance of taxed business users reduces the probability of a government granting monopoly rights, while an increase in the importance of subsidized residential users has the opposite effect. Durable democracies and market-oriented governments are less likely to award monopoly rights. Monopolies increase government revenue by 66 percent.
Product Innovation, Signaling, And Endogenous Regulatory Delay, James Prieger
Product Innovation, Signaling, And Endogenous Regulatory Delay, James Prieger
School of Public Policy Working Papers
This paper examines the determinants of the timing of a monopolistic firm’s product innovation and regulatory approval, and proposes a signaling model with endogenous regulatory delay. Regulatory delay exerts a multiplier effect on total time to market, because when the firm expects the regulator to take longer to grant approval, the firm delays its product introduction. The firm can time its innovation to communicate its private information about the marginal cost of delay to the regulator. Successful signaling in the separating equilibrium leads the regulator to reduce regulatory delay. The implications of the model are consistent with data on innovation …
A Regulatory Play In Two Acts, Scott J. Wallsten
A Regulatory Play In Two Acts, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
Mandating Access To Telecom And The Internet: The Hidden Side Of Trinko, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
Mandating Access To Telecom And The Internet: The Hidden Side Of Trinko, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust has long played a major role in telecommunications policy, demonstrated most dramatically by the equal access mandate imposed during the breakup of AT&T. In this Article we explore the extent to which antitrust can continue to serve as a source of access mandates following the Supreme Court's 2004 Trinko decision. Although Trinko sharply criticized access remedies and antitrust courts' ability to enforce them, it is not yet clear whether future courts will interpret the opinion as barring all antitrust access claims. Even more importantly, the opinion contains language hinting at possible bases for differentiating among different types of access, …