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Monopoly Rights In The Privatization Of Telephone Firms, Bruno E. Viani
Monopoly Rights In The Privatization Of Telephone Firms, Bruno E. Viani
Bruno E. Viani
Data from utility privatization sales in 74 countries is analyzed to investigate why governments award monopoly rights, and how monopoly affects government revenue from these sales. Financially constrained governments are more likely to award monopoly rights. Interest groups and institutions are important. Increased importance of taxed business users reduces the probability of a government granting monopoly rights, while an increase in the importance of subsidized residential users has the opposite effect. Durable democracies and market-oriented governments are less likely to award monopoly rights. Monopolies increase government revenue by 66 percent.
Private Control, Competition, And The Performance Of Telephone Firms In Less Developed Countries, Bruno E. Viani
Private Control, Competition, And The Performance Of Telephone Firms In Less Developed Countries, Bruno E. Viani
Bruno E. Viani
Firm-level data of 23 public telephone firms from less developed countries is used to compare the operating performance under private and state control in the period 1986-2001. Fixed-effects estimation indicates that privately controlled firms exhibit higher productive efficiency than their state counterparts after controlling for monopoly conditions, income level, and the scale of the firm’s fixed telephone network. This strongly supports the property rights theory of the firm even under the limited private property protection that less developed countries offer. On the other hand, public telephone firms that face competition on basic services and from wireless firms tend to exhibit …