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Distress Or Suffering: What Should Be Measured To Determine Animal Well-Being?, Ian J. H. Duncan
Distress Or Suffering: What Should Be Measured To Determine Animal Well-Being?, Ian J. H. Duncan
Sentience Collection
It is generally accepted that all the vertebrates and some of the invertebrates (those with large neural ganglia such as the cephalopods) are capable of subjective experiences. Amongst those experiences are the subjective, affective states, sometimes called 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The strong negative feelings are often lumped together as 'suffering' and the positive feelings as 'pleasure'. I have argued for many years that animal welfare/well-being is completely dependent on what the animal feels (Duncan, 1993, 1996, 2002). An animal's well-being is decreased by experiencing suffering and increased by experiencing pleasure. It's as simple as that.
Recognition Of Distress In Animals – A Philosophical Prolegomenon, Bernard E. Rollin
Recognition Of Distress In Animals – A Philosophical Prolegomenon, Bernard E. Rollin
Sentience Collection
For those who continue to doubt the studiability of distress or suffering or misery in all of its forms in animals, consider the following thought experiment: If the government were to come up with a billion dollars in research funding for animal distress, would that money go a-begging? We can study these states just as we studied pain—excellent work on boredom by Franciose Wemelsfelder in a volume on laboratory animal welfare I co-edited made the methodology for such study quite explicit. (Wemelsfelder, 1990) And when the ideological scales fall from our eyes, we realize that the work of scientists like …
Distress In Animals: Its Recognition And A Hypothesis For Its Assessment, David B. Morton
Distress In Animals: Its Recognition And A Hypothesis For Its Assessment, David B. Morton
Sentience Collection
This essay deals with the recognition of non-painful emotional experiences in animals, how they relate to animal wellbeing and animal welfare, and how they can be assessed, monitored and mitigated. While it is written often from a mammalian perspective, the general principles will apply to all animals that are sentient.
Concepts Of Distress, Suffering And Their Operational Interpretation, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Concepts Of Distress, Suffering And Their Operational Interpretation, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Ethology Collection
The major concern of this paper is with the operational interpretation of animal distress and suffering – that is, with the issue of how we can measure the extent of an animal’s distress in practice. I shall probably make myself very unpopular by expressing the view right from the outset that I think it is neither possible nor desirable to try to discover universal ‘indicators’ of distress that will apply to all animals in all situations.
Can We Measure Distress In Animals?, David Fraser
Can We Measure Distress In Animals?, David Fraser
Ethology Collection
When scientists try to identify and mitigate distress in animals, an obvious first question is: can we actually measure distress? Today, after three decades of scientific research on animal welfare it must seem obvious that this is possible, but let me offer a more guarded response.