Digital Commons Network^™

Getting Dynamic Implementation To Work, Yi-Chun Chen, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Tom Wilkening

Research Collection School Of Economics

We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our Simultaneous Report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that a SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth-telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided hold-up problem with ex-ante investment. The SR mechanism also …

Is Democracy Good For Growth? Development At Political Transition Time Matters, Di Sima, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

Is democracy a better political regime for economic prosperity than autocracy? This paper shows that the answer depends on the initial economic development level during the democratic transition when the foundation of institutions was laid. Democracy facilitates growth only in countries that already have adequate development at transition time. These countries are more likely to create and sustain growth-enhancing institutions than others. Without appropriate development, democracy does not improve growth; this applies to about 40% of the third-wave democratized countries. These results are based on a sample of 153 countries in 1960–2010 and robust to various specifications and endogeneity issues.

Political Connections, Informational Asymmetry, And The Efficient Resolution Of Financial Distress, Madhav S. Aney, Sanjay Banerji

Research Collection School Of Economics

We show that securities issued by a distressed firm, often through exchange offers, providethe most efficient resolution of financial restructuring. Information asymmetry between thefirm-bank coalition and small bondholders gives rise to other forms of distress resolutionsuch as refinancing, public workout, and the inefficiency of liquidation. We find that politicallobbying by the firm-bank amplifies these inefficiencies and inhibits the development of privatemarket for distressed securities. Cross-country evidence is consistent with this and indicatesthat improved creditor rights, and information facilitating credit bureaus interact in reducingthe likelihood of inefficient distress resolution.

Does A District Mandate Matter For The Behavior Of Politicians? An Analysis Of Roll-Call Votes And Parliamentary Speeches, Andreas Born, Aljoscha Janssen

Research Collection School Of Economics

In most democracies, members of parliament (MPs) are elected either through a party list or by a district. We use a discontinuity in the German electoral system to investigate the causal effect of a district election on an MP’s conformity with the party line. A district election does not affect roll-call voting behavior causally, possibly due to overall high adherence to party-line voting. Analyzing the parliamentary speeches of each MP allows us to overcome the high party-line discipline with regard to parliamentary voting. Using textual analysis and machine learning techniques, we create two measures of closeness of an MP’s speeches …

Does A District Mandate Matter For The Behavior Of Politicians? An Analysis Of Roll-Call Votes And Parliamentary Speeches, Andreas Born, Aljoscha Janssen

Research Collection School Of Economics

In most democracies, members of parliament (MPs) are elected either through a party list or by a district. We use a discontinuity in the German electoral system to investigate the causal effect of a district election on an MP’s conformity with the party line. A district election does not affect roll-call voting behavior causally, possibly due to overall high adherence to party-line voting. Analyzing the parliamentary speeches of each MP allows us to overcome the high party-line discipline with regard to parliamentary voting. Using textual analysis and machine learning techniques, we create two measures of closeness of an MP’s speeches …

Decree Power In Parliamentary Systems: Theory And Evidence From India, Madhav Shrihari Aney, Shubhankar Dam

Research Collection School Of Economics

Decree powers are common to presidential systems; they are rarely found in parliamentary ones. We analyze decree powers in one such rare setting: India. We show that bicameral minority governments in India systematically use ordinances to circumvent parliament and prosecute their legislative agendas. They promulgate more ordinances, enact less legislation, and often repromulgate lapsed ordinances. These patterns suggest that, with bicameral minority governments, the locus of lawmaking shifts to the executive branch. While both majority and minority governments invoke ordinances, the latter do so systematically to get around their parliamentary deficit. In the hands of minority governments, then, the mechanism …

Asset Classes, Nicolas L. Jacquet

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous differences in liquidity of assets based on the interaction between differences in the risk of assets and differences in liquidity needs of investors. An equilibrium of the model, which always exists and is unique, displays a class structure, where investors’ types sort themselves across different types of assets. I also provide a detailed analysis of the possible types of sorting and of the consequences for the cross-sectional properties of asset prices and their velocity. The framework can also be useful to think about what constitute a ""light-to-liquidity" and a "safe asset".

Universalism And The Value Of Political Power, Yumi Koh

Research Collection School Of Economics

While legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, near-unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game-theoretic model where players strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with non-cooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power and actual needs on the agreed-upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the "Bridge Bill Capital Budget" in 1992. I find that 9.58% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.

Determinants Of Urban Land Supply In China: How Do Political Factors Matter?, Wen-Tai Hsu, Xiaolu Li, Yang Tang, Jing Wu

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper explores two political factors for their potential effects on urban land supply in China: corruption, and competition for promotion. We find that standard urban economic predictions hold in the sense that both population and income increases are strongly significant determinants for the increase in urban land supply. Conditional on these demand-side factors, we find that the usage of two-stage auctions (as a proxy for corruption) is highly correlated with the increase in land supply. The corruption effects are strongest for commercial land, followed by residential land and then industrial land. To shed light on the competition motives among …

Jobs For Justice(S): Corruption In The Supreme Court Of India, Madhav S. Aney, Shubhankar Dam, Giovanni Ko

Research Collection School Of Economics

We investigate whether judicial decisions are affected by career concerns of judges byanalysing two questions: Do judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favourof the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Court? Does thegovernment actually reward judges who ruled in its favour with prestigious jobs? To answerthese questions we construct a dataset of all Supreme Court of India cases involving thegovernment from 1999 till 2014, with an indicator for whether the decision was in its favouror not. We find that pandering incentives have a causal effect on judicial decision-making.The exposure of a judge to …

Determinants Of Urban Land Supply In People's Republic Of China: How Do Political Factors Matter?, Wen-Tai Hsu, Xiaolu Li, Yang Tang, Jing Wu

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper explores whether and how corruption and competition-for-promotion motives affect urban land supply in the People's Republic of China. Conditional on demand-side factors, we find that corruption is highly correlated with an increase in land supply. The corruption effects are strongest for commercial land, followed by residential land, and then industrial land. To shed light on the competition motives among prefectural leaders, we examine how the number of years in office affects land supply and distinguish among different hypotheses. Our empirical results show robust rising trends in land sales. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that among prefectural …

Expropriation Risk And Competition Within The Military, Madhav S. Aney, Giovanni Ko

Research Collection School Of Economics

How can agents in the military, who control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model, even if agents within the military could expropriate all output costlessly, it is attractive to protect producers from predating military units. This marginal defensive advantage and consequently defence is an effective way to potentially eliminate is because there is a other military units, reducing competition and leading to higher future payoffs. Our model predicts that greater internal …

Executive Overreach By Minority Governments, Madhav S. Aney, Shubhankar Dam

Research Collection School Of Economics

A provision in the Indian constitution allows the executive to make laws in the event oneof the two houses of parliament is not in session. This provision was intended to allow theexecutive to act in case there’s an immediate legislative necessity and the parliament cannotbe convened. Using a bargaining model with asymmetric information we show how partieswithin the parliament may reach an agreement on legislations when the ruling party does notcommand a majority (minority government). The model makes predictions about lawmakingpatterns by the legislature when the parliament is in session, and ordinances by the executivewhen the parliament is not in …

From Coercion To Politics To Law: The Evolution Of Property Rights Protection, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt to evolving factor composition of land and capital in the dynamic economic development process. There seems to exist a clear sequence of di⁄erent forms of protection in that it is unlikely to have a strong rule of law with an exploitative political regime, or to have a democratic political system when the distribution of potential coercive power is too skewed. The routine form of protection thus shifts from coercion …

Contract Enforcement: A Political Economy Model Of Legal Development, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

In an effort to understand why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts differs across societies, this article builds a political economy model of legal development where legal quality of contract enforcement is a costly public good. It finds that legal investment tends to be too small under elite rule but too large under majority rule in comparison with the socially optimal level. Furthermore, elite rule, low legal quality, and high-income inequality may form a self-perpetuating circle that hinders economic development. In contrast to the conventional view, this article suggests that the often-observed association between heavy reliance on relational …

Demography, Development And The Origin Of Democracy: A Model With Case Studies Of Arachic Athens And Maritime England, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

No abstract provided.

The Coevolution Of Economic And Political Development From Monarchy To Democracy, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different factors in production, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables the respective factor owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to …

Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability And Corruption: Evidence From Us States, Filipe R. Campante, Quoc-Anh Do

Research Collection School Of Economics

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states. In particular, this is the case when we use the variation induced by the exogenous location of a state’s centroid to instrument for the concentration of population around the capital city. We then show that different mechanisms for holding state politicians accountable are also affected by the spatial distribution of population: newspapers provide greater coverage of state politics when their audiences are more concentrated around the capital, and voter turnout in state elections is greater in places that are closer to the capital. …

Why Did Universities Precede Primary Schools? A Political Economy Model Of Educational Change, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

Universities were first established in Europe around the twelfth century, although primary schools did not appear until the nineteenth. This paper accounts for this phenomenon using a political economy model of educational change on who are educated (the elite or the masses) and what is taught (general or specific/vocational education). A key assumption is that general education is more effective than specific education in enhancing one's skills in a broad range of tasks, including political rent-seeking. Its findings suggest that specific education for the masses is compatible with the elite rule, whereas mass general education is not, which refines the …

A Spatial Analysis Of The Italian Second Republic, Second Version, Massimiliano Landi, Ricardo Pelizzo

Research Collection School Of Economics

We apply the Optimal Classification method to a newly created dataset to provide a spatial map of the Italian Second Republic (1996-2008). We find a bi-dimensional political space in the XIII Legislature and virtually a one dimensional political space in the XIV and XV Legislatures. In addition, the main dimension is explained along the dimension government opposition rather than on the traditional left and right dimension. During the Second Republic, Italy experienced changes in electoral system and in the format of the parties. We use our data to discuss the implications of either change on the dimensionality space. We find …

One Mandarin Benefits The Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure And Nepotism In An Autocracy, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, Quoc-Anh Do, Anh Tran

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies nepotism by government officials in an authoritarian regime. We collect a unique dataset of political promotions of officials in Vietnam and estimate their impact on public infrastructure in their hometowns. We find strong positive effects on several outcomes, some with lags, including roads to villages, marketplaces, clean water access, preschools, irrigation, and local radio broadcasters, as well as the hometown’s propensity to benefit from the State’s “poor commune support program”. Nepotism is not limited to only top-level officials, pervasive even among those without direct authority over hometown budgets, stronger when the hometown chairperson’s and promoted official’s ages …

Out Of Sight, Out Of Mind: The Value Of Political Connections In Social Networks, Quoc-Anh Do, Bang Dang Nguyen, Yen Teik Lee, Kieu-Trang Nguyen

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper investigates the impact of social-network connections to politicians on firm value. We focus on the networks of university classmates and alumni among directors of U.S. public firms and congressmen. Using the Regression Discontinuity Design based on close elections from 2000 to 2008, we identify that a director’s connection to an elected congressman causes a Weighted Average Treatment Effect on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of -2.65% surrounding the election date. The effect is robust and consistent through various specifications, parametric and nonparametric, with different outcome measures and social network definitions, and across many subsamples. We find evidence to support the …

One Mandarin Benefits The Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure And Nepotism In An Autocracy, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, Quoc-Anh Do, Anh Tran

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper studies nepotism by government officials in an authoritarian regime. We collect a unique dataset of political promotions of officials in Vietnam and estimate their impact on public infrastructure in their hometowns. We find strong positive effects on several outcomes, some with lags, including roads to villages, marketplaces, clean water access, preschools, irrigation, and local radio broadcasters, as well as the hometown’s propensity to benefit from the State’s “poor commune support program”. Nepotism is not limited to only top-level officials, pervasive even among those without direct authority over hometown budgets, stronger when the hometown chairperson’s and promoted official’s ages …

The People Want The Fall Of The Regime: Schooling, Political Protest, And The Economy, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor

Research Collection School Of Economics

We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link …

Conformism And Turnout, Massimiliano Landi, Mauro Sodini

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper proposes a model of turnout in which citizens have a preference for conformism, which adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Under this environment multiple equilibria arise, some that generate a (more realistic) high level of turnout, for a wide rage of parameter values. It is also shown that high levels of turnout are robust to the introduction of asymmetry and heterogeneity in the parameter governing the preference for conformism and with respect to the reference group for conformism.

This model suggests that high turnout can only be achieved as the outcome of a particular coordination …

Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure, Madhav S. Aney, Maitreesh Ghatak, Massimo Morelli

Research Collection School Of Economics

How can market failure interact with choice of institutional reform made by an electorate? We study this question in the framework of occupational choice where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects vote on institutional reform. We find that the preferences of these classes may be highly nonmonotonic in wealth and are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between institutional reforms that are growth maximising and those that are politically feasible. This is in contrast to the world without market …

Keeping Dictators Honest: The Role Of Population, Quoc-Anh Do, Filipe R. Campante

Research Collection School Of Economics

In order to explain the apparently paradoxical presence of acceptable governance in many non-democratic regimes, economists and political scientists have focused mostly on institutions acting as de facto checks and balances. In this paper, we propose that population plays a similar role in guaranteeing the quality of governance and redistribution. We argue and demonstrate with historical evidence that the concentration of population around the policy making center serves as an insurgency threat to a dictatorship, inducing it to yield to more redistribution and better governance. We bring this centered concept of population concentration to the data through the Centered Index …

Instability And The Incentives For Corruption, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor, Quoc-Anh Do

Research Collection School Of Economics

We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand effect, by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, because firms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these …

The Labor Market Of Italian Politicians, Antonio Merlo, Vincenzo Galasso, Massimiliano Landi, Andrea Mattozzi

Research Collection School Of Economics

We analyze the career profiles of Italian legislators in the post-war period. Using a unique, newly collected dataset that contains detailed information on all the politicians who have been elected to the Italian Parliament between 1948 and 2008, we address a number of important issues that pertain to their career paths prior to election to Parliament, their parliamentary careers, and their post-Parliament employment. Our data span two institutional regimes: Italy's First Republic (1948-1994) and the Second Republic (1994-present), characterized by different electoral rules and party structures. We first present a brief overview of the Italian political system. We then provide …

The Coevolution Of Economic And Political Development, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of di¤erent production factors and the political con‡icts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main production factor in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political power in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to oligarchy and …nally to democracy with full su¤rage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to …