Digital Commons Network^™

Administrative Procedures, Bureaucracy, And Transparency: Why Does The Fcc Vote On Secret Texts?, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) does not reveal the text of regulations on which it votes. Instead, after the vote the Commission grants the relevant bureau “editorial privileges” to continue drafting the order. It then releases the final version days, weeks, or even months after the vote. As a result, it is not possible to know if everything in the final rule was actually subject to a vote. In particular, it raises the question of whether the delay between vote and publication is truly for “editorial” changes or if more substantive changes occur after the vote.

In this paper, …

From National Monopoly To Multinational Corporation: How Regulation Shaped The Road Towards Telecommunications Internationalisation, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Francisco Comín

Judith Clifton

One of the consequences of major regulatory reform of the telecommunications sector from the end of the 1970s – particularly, privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation – was the establishment of a new business environment which permitted former national telecommunications monopolies to expand abroad. From the 1990s, a number of these firms, particularly those based in Europe, joined the rankings of the world's leading multinational corporations. Their internationalisation was uneven, however: while some firms internationalised strongly, others ventured abroad much slower. This article explores how the regulatory framework within which telecommunications incumbents evolved over the long-term shaped their subsequent, uneven, paths to …

The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak

GEORGE S FORD

In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …