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Optimal Prizes For All-Pay Contests In Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing, T. Luo, S. Kanhere, S. Das, Hwee-Pink Tan
Optimal Prizes For All-Pay Contests In Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing, T. Luo, S. Kanhere, S. Das, Hwee-Pink Tan
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
Incentive is key to the success of crowd sourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowd sourcing campaigns. We cast the problem in a new, asymmetric all-pay contest model with incomplete information, where an arbitrary n of users exert irrevocable effort to compete for a prize tuple. The prize tuple is an array of prize functions as opposed to a single constant prize typically used by conventional contests. We design an optimal contest that (a) induces the maximum profit -- …
Free Market Of Crowdsourcing: Incentive Mechanism Design For Mobile Sensing, Xinglin Zhang, Zheng Yang, Zimu Zhou, Haibin Cai, Lei Chen, Xiang-Yang Li
Free Market Of Crowdsourcing: Incentive Mechanism Design For Mobile Sensing, Xinglin Zhang, Zheng Yang, Zimu Zhou, Haibin Cai, Lei Chen, Xiang-Yang Li
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low participation level of smartphone users due to various resource consumptions, such as time and power, remains a hurdle that prevents the enjoyment brought by sensing applications. Recently, some researchers have done pioneer works in motivating users to contribute their resources by designing incentive mechanisms, which are able to provide certain rewards for participation. However, none of these works considered smartphone users’ nature of opportunistically occurring in the area …
Free Market Of Crowdsourcing: Incentive Mechanism Design For Mobile Sensing, Xinglin Zhang, Zheng Yang, Zimu Zhou, Haibin Cai, Lei Chen, Xiang-Yang Li
Free Market Of Crowdsourcing: Incentive Mechanism Design For Mobile Sensing, Xinglin Zhang, Zheng Yang, Zimu Zhou, Haibin Cai, Lei Chen, Xiang-Yang Li
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low participation level of smartphone users due to various resource consumptions, such as time and power, remains a hurdle that prevents the enjoyment brought by sensing applications. Recently, some researchers have done pioneer works in motivating users to contribute their resources by designing incentive mechanisms, which are able to provide certain rewards for participation. However, none of these works considered smartphone users’ nature of opportunistically occurring in the area …