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Restorative Rigging And The Safe Indication Account, Steven Luper Nov 2006

Restorative Rigging And The Safe Indication Account, Steven Luper

Philosophy Faculty Research

Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, S, using a method, M, of believing something, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth of p, yet, in S’s circumstances, M is not reliable: M is deleteriously rigged. A different sort of scenario involves rigging that restores the reliability of a method M that is deleteriously rigged: M is restoratively rigged. Some theorists criticize (among others) the safe indication account of knowledge defended by Luper, Sosa, and Williamson on the grounds that it treats such cases as knowledge. But other theorists also criticize the safe indication account because it …


The Impossibility Of Evil Qua Evil: Kantian Limitations On Human Immorality, Timothy Alan Crews-Anderson Jul 2006

The Impossibility Of Evil Qua Evil: Kantian Limitations On Human Immorality, Timothy Alan Crews-Anderson

Philosophy Theses

Kant denies that evil qua evil can be an incentive to human beings. Is this a fact about what sorts of reasons human beings find interesting? Or, is it rooted entirely in Kant’s notion of human freedom? I focus on key facets of Kant’s system: human freedom, immorality and incentives. With an understanding of these concepts based in Christine Korsgaard’s reading of Kant’s moral theory, I argue that the impossibility of acting solely from evil qua evil is not rooted in human incentives and that if we were able to represent an unconditioned principle of immorality, we would have as …


Wittgenstein And The Metaphysics Of Ethical Value, Julian Friedland Jan 2006

Wittgenstein And The Metaphysics Of Ethical Value, Julian Friedland

Julian Friedland

This paper develops Wittgenstein’s view of how experiences of ethical value contribute to our understanding of the world. Such experiences occur when we perceive certain intrinsic attributes of a particular being, object, or location as valuable irrespective of any concern for personal gain. It is shown that experiences of ethical value essentially involve a characteristic ‘listening’ to the ongoing transformations and actualizations of a given form of life—literally or metaphorically speaking. Such immediate impressions of spontaneous sympathy and agreement reveal ethics and aesthetics as transcendental. Ultimately, I will attempt to show that from this point of view, forms of life …


Understanding Aristotle's Reproductive Hylomorphism, Devin Henry Dec 2005

Understanding Aristotle's Reproductive Hylomorphism, Devin Henry

Devin Henry

No abstract provided.