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The Ethics Of Humanitarian Intervention, Amanda J. Porter
The Ethics Of Humanitarian Intervention, Amanda J. Porter
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
This thesis investigates ethical debates that surround the definition, the conduct, and the occasions for humanitarian military intervention. I argue that properly-called humanitarian interventions must be directed by partly-altruistic intentions, and just war theorists should resist the emerging trend that discards right intention as a central requirement in favour of a more consequentialist analysis. I argue that interventions must be conducted in a manner that is consistent with the humanitarian purpose and would be accepted by the innocent non-combatants who are themselves risked by the rescue effort. This morally requires that interveners weigh harm to non-combatants particularly heavily in their …
Feeling, Impulse And Changeability: The Role Of Emotion In Hume's Theory Of The Passions, Katharina A. Paxman
Feeling, Impulse And Changeability: The Role Of Emotion In Hume's Theory Of The Passions, Katharina A. Paxman
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, including “the passions and other emotions.” These two terms for affective mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often treated by scholars as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former are the transient, changeable, valenced feelings that flow between perceptions and constitute their felt nature and impulse. The latter are the …
Kant And The Fact Of Reason, Kenneth Kh Chung
Kant And The Fact Of Reason, Kenneth Kh Chung
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
It is often thought that Kant abandoned his argument for the justification of morality in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals for a radically different argument in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the Groundwork, Kant appears to try to justify our commitment to the moral law on the basis of our freedom, but in the Critique, he tries to justify that commitment on the basis of what he calls the fact of reason. I assess and reject influential interpretations of both arguments as being philosophically unsound, and I propose, what I take to be, a …