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Belief States And Narrow Content, Curtis Brown
Belief States And Narrow Content, Curtis Brown
Philosophy Faculty Research
A discussion of four incompatible theses about belief and other propositional attitudes.
Direct And Indirect Belief, Curtis Brown
Direct And Indirect Belief, Curtis Brown
Philosophy Faculty Research
This paper discusses that one's being in a particular belief state is nevertheless best characterized by a set of propositions, namely those one would believe in any situation in which one were in that belief state. The main purpose in this paper is to develop and defend the distinction between direct and indirect belief.
Believing The Impossible, Curtis Brown
Believing The Impossible, Curtis Brown
Philosophy Faculty Research
This article offers an interpretation of Ruth Barcan Marcus's view that just as we cannot know what is false, we cannot believe what is impossible, followed by an argument that if this defense succeeded, it would justify rejecting many of out ordinary belief ascriptions. Although, this defense does not succeed there is something correct and important in Marcus's argument.
What Is A Belief State?, Curtis Brown
What Is A Belief State?, Curtis Brown
Philosophy Faculty Research
What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs.1 The observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual's intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual's context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community.