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Laterality Enhances Cognition In Australian Parrots, Maria Magat, Culum Brown Dec 2009

Laterality Enhances Cognition In Australian Parrots, Maria Magat, Culum Brown

Sentience Collection

Cerebral lateralization refers to the division of information processing in either hemisphere of the brain and is a ubiquitous trait among vertebrates and invertebrates. Given its widespread occurrence, it is likely that cerebral lateralization confers a fitness advantage. It has been hypothesized that this advantage takes the form of enhanced cognitive function, potentially via a dual processing mechanism whereby each hemisphere can be used to process specific types of information without contralateral interference. Here, we examined the influence of lateralization on problem solving by Australian parrots. The first task, a pebble-seed discrimination test, was designed for small parrot species that …


Animal Pleasure And Its Moral Significance, Jonathan Balcombe May 2009

Animal Pleasure And Its Moral Significance, Jonathan Balcombe

Sentience Collection

This paper presents arguments for, and evidence in support of, the important role of pleasure in animals’ lives, and outlines its considerable significance to humankind’s relationship to other animals. In the realms of animal sentience, almost all scholarly discussion revolves around its negative aspects: pain, stress, distress, and suffering. By contrast, the positive aspects of sentience – rewards and pleasures – have been rarely broached by scientists. Yet, evolutionary principles predict that animals, like humans, are motivated to seek rewards, and not merely to avoid pain and suffering. Natural selection favours behaviours that enhance survival and procreation. In the conscious, …


Recognition Of Distress In Animals – A Philosophical Prolegomenon, Bernard E. Rollin Jan 2009

Recognition Of Distress In Animals – A Philosophical Prolegomenon, Bernard E. Rollin

Sentience Collection

For those who continue to doubt the studiability of distress or suffering or misery in all of its forms in animals, consider the following thought experiment: If the government were to come up with a billion dollars in research funding for animal distress, would that money go a-begging? We can study these states just as we studied pain—excellent work on boredom by Franciose Wemelsfelder in a volume on laboratory animal welfare I co-edited made the methodology for such study quite explicit. (Wemelsfelder, 1990) And when the ideological scales fall from our eyes, we realize that the work of scientists like …


Constructive And Deconstructive Tool Modification By Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes), Amanda E. Bania, Stephany Harris, Hannah R. Kinsley, Sarah T. Boysen Jan 2009

Constructive And Deconstructive Tool Modification By Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes), Amanda E. Bania, Stephany Harris, Hannah R. Kinsley, Sarah T. Boysen

Sentience Collection

Nine chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were tested for their ability to assemble or disassemble the appropriate tool to obtain a food reward from two different apparatus. In its deconstructed form, the tool functioned as a probe for one apparatus. In its constructed form, the tool functioned as a hook, appropriate for a second apparatus. Each subject completed four test trials with each apparatus type. Tool types were randomized and counter-balanced between the two forms. Results demonstrated that adult and juvenile chimpanzees (N = 7) were successful with both tool types, while two infant chimpanzees performed near chance. Off-line video analyses revealed …


Understanding Norms Without A Theory Of Mind, Kristin Andrews Jan 2009

Understanding Norms Without A Theory Of Mind, Kristin Andrews

Sentience Collection

I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary …