Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Why We Still Do Not Know What A “Real” Argument Is, G. C. Goddu
Why We Still Do Not Know What A “Real” Argument Is, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is,” Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.
The 'Most Important And Fundamental' Distinction In Logic, G. C. Goddu
The 'Most Important And Fundamental' Distinction In Logic, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In this paper I argue that the debate over the purported distinction between deductive and inductive arguments can be bypassed because making the distinction is unnecessary for successfully evaluating arguments. I provide a foundation for doing logic that makes no appeal to the distinction and still performs all the relevant tasks required of an analysis of arguments. I also reply to objections to the view that we can dispense with the distinction. Finally, I conclude that the distinction between inductive and deductive arguments is not one of the most important and fundamental ideas in logic, but rather is unnecessary.