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The Lawlessness Of Sackett V. Epa, William W. Buzbee
The Lawlessness Of Sackett V. Epa, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
When the Supreme Court speaks on a disputed statutory interpretation question, its words and edicts undoubtedly are the final judicial word, binding lower courts and the executive branch. Its majority opinions are the law. But the Court’s opinions can nonetheless be assessed for how well they hew to fundamental elements of respect for the rule of law. In particular, law-respecting versus law-neglecting or lawless judicial work by the Court can be assessed in the statutory interpretation, regulatory, and separation of power realms against the following key criteria, which in turn are based on some basic rule of law tenets: analysis …
Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee
Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and the art of jazz improvisation. This exploration illuminates a middle ground between rule of law aspirations emphasizing stability and determinate meanings and contrasting claims that the untenable alternative is pervasive discretionary or politicized law. In both the law and jazz improvisation settings, the work involves constraining rules, others’ unpredictable actions, and strategic choosing with attention to where a collective creation is going. One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous characteristics of law illuminate why …
The New Laboratories Of Democracy, Gerald S. Dickinson
The New Laboratories Of Democracy, Gerald S. Dickinson
Articles
Nearly a century ago, Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman coined one of the most profound statements in American law: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Justice Brandeis reminded us of our strong tradition of federalism, where the states, exercising their sovereign power, may choose to experiment with new legislation within their separate jurisdictions without the concern that such …
A Theory Of Federalization Doctrine, Gerald S. Dickinson
A Theory Of Federalization Doctrine, Gerald S. Dickinson
Articles
The doctrine of federalization—the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court consulting state laws or adopting state court doctrines to guide and inform federal constitutional law—is an underappreciated field of study within American constitutional law. Compared to the vast collection of scholarly literature and judicial rulings addressing the outsized influence Supreme Court doctrine and federal constitutional law exert over state court doctrines and state legislative enactments, the opposite phenomenon of the states shaping Supreme Court doctrine and federal constitutional law has been under-addressed. This lack of attention to such a singular feature of American federalism is striking and has resulted in …
Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker
Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker
Faculty Publications
Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it, Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows civil suits against any "person" who violates federal rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "person" excludes states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.
This Article reconsiders that conclusion--in legalese, Section 1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity--along multiple dimensions. Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983's enactment, the caselaw …
Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha
Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha
Faculty Scholarship
Constitutional argument runs on the rails of “modalities.” These are the accepted categories of reasoning used to make claims about the content of supreme law. Some of the modalities, such as ethical and prudential arguments, seem strikingly open ended at first sight. Their contours come into clearer view, however, when we attend to the kinds of claims that are not made by constitutional interpreters – the analytical and rhetorical moves that are familiar in debates over public policy and political morality but are considered out of bounds in debates over constitutional meaning. In this Article, we seek to identify the …
Excessive Force: Justice Requires Refining State Qualified Immunity Standards For Negligent Police Officers, Angie Weiss
Excessive Force: Justice Requires Refining State Qualified Immunity Standards For Negligent Police Officers, Angie Weiss
Seattle University Law Review Online
At the time this Note was written, there was no Washington state equivalent of the § 1983 Civil Rights Act. As plaintiffs look to the Washington state courts as an alternative to federal courts, they will find that Washington state has a different structure of qualified immunity protecting law enforcement officers from liability.
In this Note, Angie Weiss recommends changing Washington state's standard of qualified immunity. This change would ensure plaintiffs have a state court path towards justice when they seek to hold law enforcement officers accountable for harm. Weiss explains the structure and context of federal qualified immunity; compares …
Intended Injury: Transferred Intent And Reliance In Climate Change Fraud, Wes Henricksen
Intended Injury: Transferred Intent And Reliance In Climate Change Fraud, Wes Henricksen
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Ecology Of Transparency Reloaded, Seth F. Kreimer
The Ecology Of Transparency Reloaded, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
As Justice Stewart famously observed, "[t]he Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act." What the Constitution's text omits, the last two generations have embedded in "small c" constitutional law and practice in the form of the Freedom of Information Act and a series of overlapping governance reforms including Inspectors General, disclosure of political contributions, the State Department’s “Dissent Channel,” the National Archives Information Security Oversight Office, and the publication rights guaranteed by New York Times v. United States. These institutions constitute an ecology of transparency.
The late Justice Scalia argued that the …
Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles And Popular Constitutionalism In The Health Care Case, Mark D. Rosen, Christopher W. Schmidt
Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles And Popular Constitutionalism In The Health Care Case, Mark D. Rosen, Christopher W. Schmidt
All Faculty Scholarship
Crucial to the Court’s disposition in the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a hypothetical mandate to purchase broccoli, which Congress never had considered and nobody thought would ever be enacted. For the five Justices who concluded the ACA exceeded Congress’s commerce power, a fatal flaw in the government’s case was its inability to offer an adequate explanation for why upholding that mandate would not entail also upholding a federal requirement that all citizens purchase broccoli. The minority insisted the broccoli mandate was distinguishable. This Article argues that the fact that all the Justices insisted on providing …
The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, And The Ends Of Good Government: A Reply To Professor Randy Barnett, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, And The Ends Of Good Government: A Reply To Professor Randy Barnett, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
Working Paper Series
Randy Barnett has recently argued that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it is an improper regulation under the Necessary and Proper Clause (in conjunction with the Commerce Clause) because it improperly "commandeers" the people and thereby violates their sovereignty. In this paper, I counter that the argument from sovereignty is unavailing because it is, among other defects, hopelessly ambiguous. The variety of historically attested meanings of "sovereignty" renders the concept useless for purposes of answering questions of comparative authority, including the authority of the Congress to mandate that individuals purchase health insurance from a private market. There is no …
Legislatively Revising Kelo V. City Of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, And Congressional Powers, Bernard W. Bell
Legislatively Revising Kelo V. City Of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, And Congressional Powers, Bernard W. Bell
Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers
This paper explores Congress’ power to limit state and local authorities’ use of eminent domain to further economic revitalization. More particularly, it examines whether Congress can constrain the discretion to invoke eminent domain which state and local officials appear entitled to under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). The question involves and exploration and assessment of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding federalism and judicial supremacy.
In providing that private property may not be taken for “public use” without just compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government …
Montesquieu's Mistakes And The True Meaning Of Separation, Laurence Claus
Montesquieu's Mistakes And The True Meaning Of Separation, Laurence Claus
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
“The political liberty of the subject,” said Montesquieu, “is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man needs not be afraid of another.” The liberty of which Montesquieu spoke is directly promoted by apportioning power among political actors in a way that minimizes opportunities for those actors to determine conclusively the reach of their own powers. Montesquieu’s constitution of liberty is the constitution that most plausibly establishes the rule of law. Montesquieu concluded that this constitution could …