Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Disclaiming Loyalty: M&A Advisors And Their Engagement Letters, Andrew F. Tuch
Disclaiming Loyalty: M&A Advisors And Their Engagement Letters, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
Are investment banks fiduciaries of their merger and acquisition clients? If not, what rules, if any, constrain the conflicts of interest M&A advisors may face when advising their clients? These questions are rarely asked but central to the regulation of investment banking activities. In their article Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2014), Professors William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter contend that M&A advisors effectively contract out of fiduciary duties in their client engagement letters, “emerging] in practice as arm’s-length counterparties constrained less by rules of law than by a market for reputation.” They also regard recent …
Banker Loyalty In Mergers And Acquisitions, Andrew F. Tuch
Banker Loyalty In Mergers And Acquisitions, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
When investment banks advise on merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, are they fiduciaries of their clients, gatekeepers for investors, or simply arm’s-length counterparties with no other-regarding duties? Scholars have generally treated M&A advisors as arm’s-length counterparties, putting faith in the power of contract law and market constraints to discipline errant bank behavior. This Article counters that view, arguing that investment banks are rightly characterized as fiduciaries of their M&A clients and thus required to loyally serve client interests.
This Article also develops an analytical framework for assessing the liability rules that will most effectively deter disloyalty on the part of …