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A Hedgehog's Unity Of Value, Joseph Raz
A Hedgehog's Unity Of Value, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The paper examines various interpretations of Dworkin’s thesis of the Unity of Value, as expressed and defended in his book Justice for Hedgehogs. Dworkin’s arguments for various aspects of his unity of value thesis are relied on in interpreting the which is then compared with versions of value pluralism.
On Normativity And Responsibility: Responses, Joseph Raz
On Normativity And Responsibility: Responses, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
Contains responses to comments by Chang, Hestein and Heuer on "From Normativity to Responsibility". The paper responds to various criticisms especially about methodology, the bearing of a secure area of competence on responsibility, the univocality of 'reasons', the relations of value and practical reasons, the scope of rational powers, the function of reasons to be rational, and most extensively about following reasons and the distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (where Heuer has pointed out some deficiencies in the discussion of the matter in the book).
Responsibility And The Negligence Standard, Joseph Raz
Responsibility And The Negligence Standard, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The paper has dual aim: to analyse the structure of negligence, and to use it to offer an explanation of responsibility (for actions, omissions, consequences) in terms of the relations which must exist between the action (omission, etc.) and the agents powers of rational agency if the agent is responsible for the action. The discussion involves reflections on the relations between the law and the morality of negligence, the difference between negligence and strict liability, the role of excuses and the grounds of duties to pay damages.
Agency And Luck, Joseph Raz
Agency And Luck, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
Advancing an account of responsibility which is based on the functioning of our rational capacities, the paper revisits some central aspects of the moral luck puzzle. It proposes a new variant of Williams’ agent-regret, but concludes that its scope does not coincide with cases of moral luck. It then distinguishes different ways in which the factors beyond our control feature in our engagement with the world which show how the guidance principle (we are responsible for actions guided by our rational powers) recognises a narrower range of situations of moral luck than is often supposed, allowing to distinguish between responsibility …