Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Risk Aversion And Rights Accretion In Intellectual Property Law, James Gibson
Risk Aversion And Rights Accretion In Intellectual Property Law, James Gibson
ExpressO
Intellectual property’s road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because liability is difficult to predict, intellectual property users often seek licenses even when proceeding without one might be permissible. Yet because the existence (vel non) of licensing markets plays a key role in determining the breadth of rights, these seemingly sensible licensing decisions eventually feed back into doctrine; the licensing itself becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use. Over time, then, public privilege recedes and rights expand, moving intellectual property’s ubiquitous gray areas into what used to be virgin territory--where risk aversion again creates licensing markets, which cause …
Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, David M. Driesen
Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, David M. Driesen
ExpressO
This article explores the question of whether contemporary regulatory reformers’ attitudes toward government regulation have anything in common with those of the Lochner-era Court. It finds that both groups tend to favor value neutral law guided by cost-benefit analysis over legislative value choices. Their skepticism toward redistributive legislation reflects shared beliefs that regulation often proves counterproductive in terms of its own objectives, fails demanding tests for rationality, and violates the natural order. This parallelism raises fresh questions about claims of neutrality and heightened rationality that serve as important justifications modern regulatory reform.
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Articles
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their liability exposure in a number of ways. Prior scholarship has dwelled primarily on the possibility that they may respond to the threat of liability by augmenting the amount of care they take.1 Defendants (I limit myself to defendants for simplicity) will increase their expenditures on care, so the theory goes, when those expenditures yield sufficient liability-reducing dividends; more care decreases liability exposure by simultaneously making it less likely that the actors will be found to have behaved tortiously in the event of an accident and …