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Democracy, Deference, And Compromise: Understanding And Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, Scott P. Bloomberg
Democracy, Deference, And Compromise: Understanding And Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, Scott P. Bloomberg
Faculty Publications
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo—cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption. Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive account of …
Liquidating Elector Discretion, Rebecca Green
Liquidating Elector Discretion, Rebecca Green
Faculty Publications
In Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, the US. Supreme Court determined that states may constitutionally remove or punish faithless electors. In support of its holding, the Court cited a 2014 case called National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, which blessed a form of constitutional interpretation that looks to settled practice (or "liquidation," as James Madison called it) to resolve constitutional ambiguity. The Court agreed with petitioners that electors following the majority will of voters in their state is settled practice. This Article engages this assertion, suggesting that the question is more nuanced than the Court allowed. It …
How Many Votes Is Too Few?, Rebecca Green