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Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward Rock
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward Rock
Vanderbilt Law Review
Enron. Worldcom. Adelphia. Global Crossing. Tyco. Corporate scandals have made the front pages. Congress has gotten in the act. Members have held numerous hearings, given speeches, and, ultimately, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has been busy writing regulations and leaning on the stock exchanges to modify their listing requirements, all in order to restore "investor confidence." Federal prosecutors have indicted executives of Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia and their minions in the auditing and investment banking industries. State officials have also been active. Several states have passed statutes that resemble or go beyond the strictures of …
Toward A New Federalism In State Civil Justice: Developing A Uniform Code Of State Civil Procedure Through A Collaborative Rule-Making Process, Glenn S. Koppel
Toward A New Federalism In State Civil Justice: Developing A Uniform Code Of State Civil Procedure Through A Collaborative Rule-Making Process, Glenn S. Koppel
Vanderbilt Law Review
There is a sense of "deja vu" to the vision of a uniform body of state procedural law applicable in every state court throughout the nation. "Swift v. Tysons'" dream of a nationally uniform body of state substantive common law that mirrored an evolving body of uniform federal common law never materialized because state courts refused to defer to federal common law, which was applied only in federal court. Swift itself was overturned in 1938 by the Supreme Court's ruling in "Erie Railroad v. Tompkins" that federal courts must defer to the substantive lawmaking authority of state courts. But almost …
Dual Constitutions And Constitutional Duels: Separation Of Powers And State Implementation Of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs And Standards, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Frequently, state-wide executive agencies and localities attempt to implement federally-inspired programs. Two predominant examples are cooperative federalism programs and incorporation of federal standards in state-specific law. Federally-inspired programs can bump into state constitutional restrictions on the allocation of powers, especially in states whose constitutional systems embrace stronger prohibitions on legislative delegation than the weak restrictions at the federal level, where national goals and standards are made. This Article addresses this tension between dual federal/state normative accounts of the constitutional allocation of powers in state implementation of federally-inspired programs. To the extent the predominant ways of resolving the tension come from …
Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi
Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a deference trap in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries, such as telecommunications and electric power. The deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory agencies and states. By reassessing the deference trap across the legal doctrines that are effecting emerging telecommunications and electric power markets, public law can deliver much more for deregulated markets. The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in which public and …
Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi
Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose …