Digital Commons Network^™

A Revised Monitoring Model Confronts Today's Movement Toward Managerialism, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

There are many lessons to be drawn from the sweep of history. In law, the compelling story repeatedly told is the observable co-movement of law on the one hand, and economic, social, and political changes on the other hand. Aberrations, however, do arise but generally do not persist in the long term. Contemporary corporate law seems to be on the cusp of such an abnormality as legal developments and proposed reforms for corporate law are currently conflicting with the direction in which the host environment is moving. This article identifies a series of contemporary judicial and regulatory corporate governance developments …

A Difficult Conversation: Corporate Directors On Race And Gender, Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium essay summarizes our ongoing ethnographic research on corporate board diversity, discussing the central tension in our respondents’ views – their overwhelmingly enthusiastic support of board diversity coupled with an inability to articulate coherent accounts of board diversity benefits that might rationalize that enthusiasm. As their reactions make clear, frank dialogue about race and gender – even a seemingly benign discussion of diversity’s benefits – can be a difficult conversation.

The Danger Of Difference: Tensions In Directors’ View Of Corporate Board Diversity, Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome

Faculty Scholarship

This Article describes the results from fifty-seven interviews with corporate directors and a limited number of other persons (including institutional investors, search firm personnel, and the like) regarding their views on corporate board diversity. It highlights numerous tensions in these views. Most directors, for instance, proclaim that diverse boards are good, but very few directors can articulate their reasons for this belief. Some directors have suggested that diverse boards work better than non-diverse boards, but gave relatively few concrete examples of specific instances where a female or minority board member made a special contribution related to that director’s race or …

Comply-And-Explain: Should Directors Have A Duty To Inform?, John C. Wilcox

Law and Contemporary Problems

Wilcox discusses the compliance of the duty to inform of directors of publicly held companies. The expected long-term impact of a duty to inform would be to "operationalize" corporate governance policies and accustom boards to provide greater transparency about their deliberations and decisions on matters relating to governance, business oversight, and strategy. Regardless of whether a directors' duty to inform can be inferred from the Model Business Corporation Act or other provisions of state law, it could be implemented through the adoption of a charter or bylaw amendment initiated by the board or by shareholders.

Does Critical Mass Matter? Views From The Board Room, Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we report and analyze the results of forty-six wide-ranging interviews with corporate directors and other relevant insiders on the general topic of whether and how the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of corporate boards matters. In particular, we explore their views on the concept of “critical mass” — that is, the theory that women and racial or ethnic minorities are unlikely to have an impact in the boardroom until they grow from a few tokens into a considerable minority of the board.

In contrast to other recent qualitative research on corporate boards, we find more limited support …

Director Confidentiality, Cyril Moscow

Law and Contemporary Problems

The Corporate Directors Guidebook contains the bare proposition that a director must keep confidential all matters involving the corporation that have not been disclosed to the public. Moscow explores the need to modify the flat recitation of a rule of director confidentiality in light of the limited authority for a blanket restriction, and the necessary exceptions in the business contexts in which the issue arises. In particular, many situations do not involve damage to the corporation, or there is express or implied consent to the sharing of information.

Indemnification And Advancement Through An Agency Lens, Deborah A. Demott

Law and Contemporary Problems

DeMott discusses the doctrines that define entitlements to indemnification. In the corporate context, indemnification is better grounded, as in the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), in the necessity of furnishing corporate directors with appropriate protection against personal risk. To be sure, as the MBCA's official comments implicitly acknowledge, the position of officers, especially senior executive officers, does not fit neatly and exclusively into either an "agent" or a "non-agent" category for indemnification purposes.

Classified Boards And Firm Value, Michael D. Frakes

Faculty Scholarship

Classified boards constitute one of the most potent takeover defenses for U.S. firms today. However, as with takeover defenses more generally, economic theory offers an ambiguous prediction as to the effect that classified boards have on bottom-line firm value. A resolution of this ambiguity will require sound and convincing empirical methodology. In an effort to address limitations in the existing empirical literature, this article approaches the relationship between corporate governance and firm value while taking various measures to account for unobserved sources of heterogeneity across firms. Using the instrumental variables model developed by Hausman and Taylor, I find evidence of …

Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment Of Canadian Remedies For Minority Shareholders And Other Corporate Constituents, Deborah A. Demott

Law and Contemporary Problems

The distinctive Canadian contribution to the resolution of conflict among shareholders and of conflict between nonshareholder constituents--such as creditors--and persons controlling a corporation, typically its shareholders and directors, is examined with respect to comparable US judicial remedies.

Changing Perceptions Into Reality: Fiduciary Standards To Match The American Directors’ Monitoring Function, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

This paper describes the historical fiduciary obligations of the American outside director and contrasts those obligations with prevailing obligations in today’s environment of the monitoring director. Special attention is devoted to the role of outside directors when their firm is the target of a takeover. In no other context are the demands on the outside director greater and more strain placed on the monitoring model than in the context of a corporate takeover. The final section of this paper examines the relief modern statutory provisions provide to the director and the monitoring function