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Comply-And-Explain: Should Directors Have A Duty To Inform?, John C. Wilcox
Comply-And-Explain: Should Directors Have A Duty To Inform?, John C. Wilcox
Law and Contemporary Problems
Wilcox discusses the compliance of the duty to inform of directors of publicly held companies. The expected long-term impact of a duty to inform would be to "operationalize" corporate governance policies and accustom boards to provide greater transparency about their deliberations and decisions on matters relating to governance, business oversight, and strategy. Regardless of whether a directors' duty to inform can be inferred from the Model Business Corporation Act or other provisions of state law, it could be implemented through the adoption of a charter or bylaw amendment initiated by the board or by shareholders.
Safe Harbor For Officer Reliance: Comparing The Approaches Of The Model Business Corporation Act And Delaware’S General Corporation Law, R. Franklin Balotti, Megan W. Shaner
Safe Harbor For Officer Reliance: Comparing The Approaches Of The Model Business Corporation Act And Delaware’S General Corporation Law, R. Franklin Balotti, Megan W. Shaner
Law and Contemporary Problems
Balotti and Shaner discuss the duties of and potential for imposing liability on corporate officers. The fiduciary duties of officers is addressed, in differing degrees, under Delaware law, the law frequently applied to corporate-governance disputes, and under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). In discharging their fiduciary duties, directors under both the MBCA and the General Corporation Law are generally protected from personal liability if, in making business decisions, they reasonably rely on the reports and records of officers, employees, advisors, and experts of the corporation.
Director Confidentiality, Cyril Moscow
Director Confidentiality, Cyril Moscow
Law and Contemporary Problems
The Corporate Directors Guidebook contains the bare proposition that a director must keep confidential all matters involving the corporation that have not been disclosed to the public. Moscow explores the need to modify the flat recitation of a rule of director confidentiality in light of the limited authority for a blanket restriction, and the necessary exceptions in the business contexts in which the issue arises. In particular, many situations do not involve damage to the corporation, or there is express or implied consent to the sharing of information.
The 1970s: The Committee On Corporate Laws Joins The Corporate Governance Debate, Marshall L. Small
The 1970s: The Committee On Corporate Laws Joins The Corporate Governance Debate, Marshall L. Small
Law and Contemporary Problems
No abstract provided.