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Rewards For Continued Work: The Economic Incentives For Postponing Retirement, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary S. Fields
Rewards For Continued Work: The Economic Incentives For Postponing Retirement, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary S. Fields
Gary S Fields
This chapter develops empirical measures of the economic incentives for deferred retirement among older workers. Using a new data file on pay and pensions, we construct intertemporal budget sets reflecting income available to workers at alternative retirement ages. The analysis explores how continued labor force attachment is rewarded in terms of net earnings, Social Security benefits, and private pension income.
Lessons From The American Federal-State Unemployment Insurance System For A European Unemployment Benefits System, Christopher J. O'Leary, Burt S. Barnow
Lessons From The American Federal-State Unemployment Insurance System For A European Unemployment Benefits System, Christopher J. O'Leary, Burt S. Barnow
Christopher J. O'Leary
The federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 during the Great Depression. Under the program, states provide temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers with significant labor force attachment. The federal government induced states to establish UI programs through two means: 1) a uniform federal tax imposed on employer payrolls, with a 90 percent reduction granted in states operating approved UI programs, and 2) grants to states to administer their programs. The system has evolved into a collection of separate state programs adapted to different regional, economic, …
Simulating The Effects Of The Tax Credit Program Of The Michigan Economic Growth Authority On Job Creation And Fiscal Benefits, Timothy Bartik, George Erickcek
Simulating The Effects Of The Tax Credit Program Of The Michigan Economic Growth Authority On Job Creation And Fiscal Benefits, Timothy Bartik, George Erickcek
Timothy J. Bartik
No abstract provided.
Review Of The Book An Incentives Approach To Improving The Unemployment Compensation System, Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Review Of The Book An Incentives Approach To Improving The Unemployment Compensation System, Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
[Excerpt] This volume is the result of over two decades of research by the author on the unemployment insurance (UI) system. It focuses on the overpayment of UI benefits: payments to individuals that are larger than they should be because of miscalculations of benefit levels by administrative agencies or the failure of individuals to meet initial or continuing eligibility requirements for the receipt of benefits.
Review Of The Book Incentives, Cooperation And Risk Sharing: Economic And Psychological Perspectives On Employment Contracts, Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Review Of The Book Incentives, Cooperation And Risk Sharing: Economic And Psychological Perspectives On Employment Contracts, Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
[Excerpt] The current volume, which grew out of a two-day conference held at New York University in 1984, is an excellent introduction to compensation policy research and practice. A unique aspect of the volume is its interdisciplinary orientation; the contributors include academic economists and industrial psychologists, as well as practicing compensation and personnel and human resource specialists. A very readable introductory essay by the editor provides general discussion of analytical issues in compensation policy research and whets the reader's appetite for the papers that follow.
Introduction: Do Compensation Policies Matter?, Ronald Ehrenberg
Introduction: Do Compensation Policies Matter?, Ronald Ehrenberg
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
[Excerpt] The papers in this volume should give the reader a sense of the exciting empirical research that has recently taken place on compensation-related issues. As a set, these papers considerably expand our empirical evidence on the effects of compensation policies. Several papers show that executive compensation is structured in a way that at least implicitly ties executive compensation changes to measures of corporate performance, and —crucially—that doing so leads to improved corporate performance (Leonard, Murphy/Gibbons, Abowd). Others show that compensation systems that pay workers for performance, in the sense of providing explicit or implicit incentives for high levels of …
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
PHILIP E GRAVES
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Robert L Sexton
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Robert L Sexton
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.