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Optimal Task Assignments, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Optimal Task Assignments, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Felipe Balmaceda
This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off involved is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than that under specialization. The principal prefers multitasking to specialization except when tasks are complements and the output after success is small enough so that it is not second-best optimal to implement high effort in each task. This …
An Estimated Open-Economy Dsge Model With Search-And-Matching Frictions: The Case Of Hungary, Istvan Konya, Zoltán Jakab
An Estimated Open-Economy Dsge Model With Search-And-Matching Frictions: The Case Of Hungary, Istvan Konya, Zoltán Jakab
Istvan Konya
This paper builds and estimates a mediumscale, small open economy DSGE model augmented with search-and-matching frictions in the labor market, and different wage setting behavior in new and existing jobs. The model is estimated using Hungarian data between 2001-2008. We find that: (i) the inclusion of matching frictions significantly improves the model’s empirical fit; (ii) the extent of new hires wage rigidity is quantitatively important for keymacro variables; (iii) labor market shocks do not play an important role in inflation dynamics, but the structure of the labor market influences the monetary transmission mechanism.
The Price Of Unobservability: Moral Hazard And Limited Liability, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
The Price Of Unobservability: Moral Hazard And Limited Liability, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Felipe Balmaceda
This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract (the price of unobservability). Our main results provide tight bounds for this price. Key parameters to these bounds are number of possible efforts, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest efforts. The …
The Effects Of Immigration On Household Services, Labour Supply And Fertility, Agnese Romiti
The Effects Of Immigration On Household Services, Labour Supply And Fertility, Agnese Romiti
Agnese Romiti
Fertility and female labour force participation are no longer negatively correlated in developed countries. Recently, the role of immigration has been put forward as a driving factor among others. Increased immigration affects supply and prices of household services, which are relevant for fertility and employment decisions. This paper analyses the effect of immigration on labour supply and fertility of native women in the UK, with a focus on the role of immigration on household services. Adopting an instrumental variable approach based on the country-specific past distribution of immigrants at regional level, I find that immigration increases female labour supply, without …