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Helmand: The U.S. Marines And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan, 2010-2012, Taylor L. Lewis

Master's Theses

In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, American troops contended with insurgent forces resistant to conventional tactics. General David Petraeus, along with other military experts, addressed the need for new strategies with the publication of Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (3-33.5) in 2006. The manual laid out methods by which American troops should quell insurgent threats in Iraq and Afghanistan. This thesis is concerned with how the Marine Corps enacted the policies of 3-33.5 in Helmand Province between 2010 and 2012.

The tenants of this new manual were tested in the years following President Barak Obama’s commitment of …

Sir Robert Thompson’S Better War: The British Advisory Mission And The South Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963, Richard Sears Lovering

Master's Theses

This thesis examines the interactions between the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam (BRIAM) and the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem and his American advisors. By studying BRIAM’s efforts—and those of its leader, Sir Robert Thompson—this thesis argues that many of the tactics Thompson advocated and Diem executed, especially the Strategic Hamlet Program, foreshadowed the techniques Americans used several years later under General Creighton Abrams, during the period historian Lewis Sorley termed the “better war.”

Sorley argued that the American strategy in the Vietnam War was flawed until Abrams implemented his “one war” plan. With this interpretation, however, …

Winning At The Graduate Level Of Warfare: Six Core Factors Of A Successful Counterinsurgency Campaign And The Example Of Sierra Leone, John D. Rimann

Honors Theses

The most common form of warfare so far in the 21st Century has been insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, types of warfare which are particularly challenging for industrialized Western nations to wage effectively. This paper identifies six factors of primary importance which form the key to a successful counterinsurgency campaign. These factors are legitimacy, clarity, beneficial geopolitical factors, restraint, intellectual understanding, and an enduring commitment. This paper argues that these factors must all be present for a counterinsurgency campaign to succeed, and argues that without these factors being accounted for a counterinsurgency will fail. The British humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone in …