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Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff
Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
“Pay-for-delay” settlements, also known as reverse payments, arise when a generic manufacturer pursues FDA approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug. If a patent protects the brand-name drug, the generic manufacturer has the option of contesting the validity of the patent or arguing that its product does not infringe the patent covering the brand-name drug. If the generic manufacturer prevails on either of these claims, the FDA will approve its generic version for sale. Approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug reduces the profitability of the brand-name drug by forcing the brand-name manufacturer to price its …
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, Timothy A. Cook
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, Timothy A. Cook
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
Should a branded pharmaceutical company be allowed to pay a generic competitor to stay out of the market for a drug? Antitrust policy implies that such a deal should be prohibited, but the answer becomes less clear when the transaction is packaged as a patent-litigation settlement. Since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, which encourages generic manufacturers to challenge pharmaceutical patent validity, settlements of this kind have been on the rise. Congress, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission have condemned these agreements as anticompetitive and costly to American consumers, but none of these bodies has been able to …
Does Misery Love Company - Evidence From Pharmaceutical Markets Before And After The Orphan Drug Act, Frank R. Lichtenberg, Joel Waldfogel
Does Misery Love Company - Evidence From Pharmaceutical Markets Before And After The Orphan Drug Act, Frank R. Lichtenberg, Joel Waldfogel
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
The possibility that small populations would see few medications developed for their conditions has [...] led the U.S. Congress to pass the 1983 Orphan Drug Act ("ODA"), giving firms special incentives to develop drugs for diseases afflicting fewer than 200,000 persons per year.[...][U]under the Act, drug makers receive seven years of exclusive marketing upon FDA approval of newly-developed drugs qualifying as "orphan drugs"--i.e., drugs for disorders affecting fewer than 200,000 persons.[...]Together, [the] provisions (a) increase the effective market size; and (b) reduce fixed (sunk) costs. In doing so, the Act provides a natural experiment for measuring the impact of increased …
Pdufa And Initial U.S. Drug Launches, Mary K. Olson
Pdufa And Initial U.S. Drug Launches, Mary K. Olson
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
In the 1970s and 1980s, many pharmaceutical firms launched new drugs abroad prior to gaining U.S. approval. Consequently, U.S. patients often faced delays in accessing important new medicines. High regulatory barriers to entry, such as a stringent regulation and a lengthy drug review process, contributed to this problem. This Article examines the impact of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), and subsequent increases in the speed of FDA review, on the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launches. These factors are hypothesized to lower regulatory barriers to entry in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. The results show that increased drug review …
The Chinese Regulatory Licensing Regime For Pharmaceutical Products: A Law And Economics Analysis, Qing Zhang
The Chinese Regulatory Licensing Regime For Pharmaceutical Products: A Law And Economics Analysis, Qing Zhang
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
China's pharmaceutical market has expanded dramatically in the past twenty years and is expected to become the largest in the world by the year 2050. However, entry to the market remains difficult for many international pharmaceutical manufacturers due to the country's costly and complicated regulatory licensing requirements. This Article provides an overview of the regulatory licensing regime for pharmaceutical products in China. Then, the Article evaluates three key features of the regulatory licensing regime through a law and economics approach. These features include the use of licensing, as contrasted with alternative regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms; the standards to be met …
The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry Into A Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Market In The Absence Of Fda Incentives, Jeremiah Helm
The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry Into A Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Market In The Absence Of Fda Incentives, Jeremiah Helm
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
Generic drugs play an important role in the American system of health care. Most anticipate that the entry of these drugs into the market will lower prices and thereby increase treatment options for consumers. To stimulate generic entry, the Food and Drug Administration currently offers a period of marketing exclusivity to the first firm that gains approval for a generic version of a branded drug. During this 180-day period, only two firms can sell versions of the drug: the original, branded drug maker and the first approved generic firm. After the period of exclusivity expires, other generic firms are free …