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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
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Hate Speech, Public Assurance, And The Civic Standing Of Speakers And Victims, Vincent A. Blasi
Hate Speech, Public Assurance, And The Civic Standing Of Speakers And Victims, Vincent A. Blasi
Faculty Scholarship
Jeremy Waldron and James Weinstein have opened up a promising line of inquiry regarding the legitimacy and propriety of hate speech regulation. In doing so, they have succeeded in reinvigorating a subject that had grown academically formulaic even while becoming alarmingly more salient politically and culturally. Together they have enriched our understanding with their specificity of argumentation, intellectual courage, fairminded attentiveness to critics and counter-arguments, comparative law perspective, and genuine originality of conception. I find that each has shown me at least one significant problem in the other’s analysis, a symmetry that I consider a tribute to both.
Contingent Constitutionality, Legislative Facts, And Campaign Finance, Michael T. Morley
Contingent Constitutionality, Legislative Facts, And Campaign Finance, Michael T. Morley
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Post-Katrina Suppression Of Black Working-Class Political Expression, Taunya L. Banks
Post-Katrina Suppression Of Black Working-Class Political Expression, Taunya L. Banks
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach To The Constitutional Meaning Of Confessional Symbols, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Pasquale Annicchino
Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach To The Constitutional Meaning Of Confessional Symbols, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Pasquale Annicchino
Faculty Scholarship
In the United States and Europe the constitutionality of government displays of confessional symbols depends on whether the symbols also have nonconfessional secular meaning (in the U.S.) or whether the confessional meaning is at least absent (in Europe). Yet both the United States Supreme Court (USSCt) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) lack a workable approach to determining whether secular meaning is present or confessional meaning absent.
The problem is that the government can nearly always articulate a possible secular meaning for the confessional symbols that it uses, or argue that the confessional meaning is passive and ineffective. …
Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin
Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin
Faculty Scholarship
One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of an area of increasing importance – algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing substantive communications. We could of course adopt …
Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher
Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher
Faculty Scholarship
A great deal of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But courts and scholars have done little to consider whether or why such meaningless speech, like nonrepresentational art, falls within “the freedom of speech.” If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from sound and expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for nonsense is complicated. And because nonsense is so common, the case is also important — artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the outcome.
This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship between …
Finley, Forbes And The First Amendment: Does He Who Pays The Piper Call The Tune?, Joel Gora
Finley, Forbes And The First Amendment: Does He Who Pays The Piper Call The Tune?, Joel Gora
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.