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Are School Superintendents Rewarded For “Performance”?, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard P. Chaykowski, Randy Ann Ehrenberg

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

[Excerpt] This chapter presents analyses of the compensation and mobility of school superintendents in New York State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period. The focus is on school superintendents because they are the chief operating officers of school districts, their salaries are determined through individual "negotiations" with school boards, and their salary data were made available to us. In contrast, school principals' salary data were not available to us. Especially in large districts, principals tend to be members of a union and their salary increases negotiated collectively, which limits the likelihood of observing individual principals' salaries being related to measures …

Executive Compensation In Municipalities, Gerald S. Goldstein, Ronald G. Ehrenberg

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

[Excerpt] In this paper we are concerned with the salaries of three important municipal officials; city-managers, police chiefs, and fire chiefs. We present a model that relates the salaries of these officials to a set of explanatory variables, the most important being measures associated with job performance. Two of these measures of performance are developed in the study. Further, the influence of the city-manager form of government on the incentive structure facing police chiefs and fire chiefs, and the interdependence betwen the salaries of police chiefs and fire chiefs is investigated. The model is tested using cross-section data for 1967.

Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?, Ronald Ehrenberg, Michael Bognanno

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions, tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players' scores) are both available. We find strong support for the proposition …

Modeling Offensive Performance And Salary In Major League Baseball, Joseph E. Ojanen

Culminating Projects in Economics

There are numerous statistics, such as Batting Average, On-Base Percentage, and Slugging Percentage, which attempt to measure the value of Major League Baseball players. However, the statistics commonly used today each have problems associated with it, which means they are not a good predictor of runs scored.

In an attempt to improve on these statistics, numerous models have been developed by Lindsey, Pankin, James, Bennet and Flueck, Thom, Palmer, and Gershman, and Furtado that estimate runs by assigning values to various statistics. There have also been numerous models, such as those by Hakes and Sauer, Brown and Jepsen, and Stone …

Officer Performance And Compensation In Local Building Trades Unions, Ronald G. Ehrenberg

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

[Excerpt] This paper presents estimates of the relationship between the performance and compensation of local building trades union leaders. A growing literature has revived the common-sense notion that organizations should structure the compensation of both their employees and their executives so as to encourage them to take actions consistent with the goals of the organizations. One way to minimize the probability that executives will take actions contrary to the organization's goals is to tie their compensation to measures of their organization's performance.

The Incentive Effects Of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence From The European Pga Tour, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael L. Bognanno

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

This analysis of data from the 1987 European Men's Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players' performance. Specifically, players' performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play (a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks). The authors suggest that these results, together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 U.S. Men's …

Do Teachers’ Race, Gender, And Ethnicity Matter? Evidence From The National Education Longitudinal Study Of 1988, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Daniel D. Goldhaber, Dominic J. Brewer

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

Using data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS), the authors find that the match between teachers' race, gender, and ethnicity and those of their students had little association with how much the students learned, but in several instances it seems to have been a significant determinant of teachers' subjective evaluations of their students. For example, test scores of white female students in mathematics and science did not increase more rapidly when the teacher was a white woman than when the teacher was a white man, but white female teachers evaluated their white female students more highly than …

Players' Performance Index For Major League Soccer, Joel Correll

All Theses

This paper analyzes player compensation and team finances within Major League Soccer's 2007 season by calculating salaries with respect to the player's marginal revenue product and performance parameters. The player's performance index is a calculated overall value which takes into account variations of weighted in-game actions. This performance index is tied together with a player's marginal revenue product to determine their actual economic value with respect to their 2007 rating. The paper concludes that on average, Major League Soccer as a whole compensates players based on the team's marginal revenue product, and not the individuals. The study also finds clear …

The Look Of The Line: An Empirical Investigation Of The Impacts Of Facial Symmetry On Salary Levels Of Offensive Linemen In The Nfl, Kristen Wampole

Business and Economics Honors Papers

Evaluation of a professional athlete's performance for the purposes of compensation determination is difficult, especially when decision making may not follow the expected "instrumental rationality." This paper will look to examine the factors, both productive and non-productive, impacting an Offensive Lineman's salary in the NFL. The purpose of this study is to determine whether an offensive lineman's salary is based on productive characteristics adhering to instrumental rationality, or whether the influence of non-productive characteristics influence salary as ultimately determined by team management. Results indicate that players within the tackle position with earning salaries in the seventy-fifth percentile gain additional benefits …