Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Research Collection School Of Economics
We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging inefficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.
Let's Talk About Text: Contracts, Claims, And Judicial Philosophy At The Federal Circuit, Andrew T. Langford
Let's Talk About Text: Contracts, Claims, And Judicial Philosophy At The Federal Circuit, Andrew T. Langford
IP Theory
No abstract provided.
Regulation Of Intellectual Property And Contract Structure, Ouida Black
Regulation Of Intellectual Property And Contract Structure, Ouida Black
All Theses
This paper seeks to address the newest issue arising between songwriters and their record companies in the music industry which is the underpayment of royalties. This paper will seek to answer if with more and more artists and songwriters suing for compensation due to underpayment of royalties, will artists lose the incentive to create new music and eventually decrease overall production? Clearly defining and regulating intellectual property and the use and efficiency of contracts will be topics for discussion. After testing my hypothesis, some results show no decrease, whereas, other results report some decrease in record company and songwriter incentives …
Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition.
The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow
The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow
Master's Theses
Drawing on firm-level data from the district of Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, India, this study explores the role of family ties as a means to counteract potential moral hazard concerns. It is shown that firms will be more likely to employ family relations when faced with a higher hidden context for moral hazard. Specifically, the analysis finds that the presence of family members within the firm is higher when the firm provides general training and that firms that are more likely to do external business with family relations when it is believed that the legal system is not effective. Additionally, …
Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory Of Altering Rules, Ian Ayres
Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory Of Altering Rules, Ian Ayres
Ian Ayres
Whenever a rule is contractible, the law must establish separate rules governing how private parties can contract around the default legal treatment. To date, contract theorists have not developed satisfying theories for how optimally to set “altering rules,” the rules that set out the necessary and sufficient conditions for displacing a default. This Article argues that efficiency-minded lawmakers in setting altering rules should consider both the costs of altering and the costs of various kinds of error. There are two broad reasons for altering rules to deviate from attempts to minimize the transaction cost of altering, First, the Article develops …
United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
This chapter adopts the working assumption that it is conceivable that at some time in the future it would be in the interest of the United States to restructure its sovereign debt (i.e., to reduce the principal amount). It addresses in particular U.S. Treasury Securities. The chapter first provides an overview of the intermediated, tiered holding system for book-entry Treasuries. For the first time the chapter then explores whether and how—logistically and legally—such a restructuring could be effected. It posits the sort of dire scenario that might make such a restructuring advantageous. It then outlines a novel scheme …