Digital Commons Network^™

Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We also are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative auction parameters. Three simulation models are developed and analyzed. The first model (Model 1) uses historical price data from October 1995 through May 2006 to assess the performance risk of hypothetical thermal and hydro generating units. The second model (Model 2) uses historical price and operating data to assess performance risk of the …

The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term energy contracts and those based on short-term capacity markets spawned two design tracks. Long-term contracts led to call-option obligations which provide market-power control and the ability to strengthen performance incentives, but this approach fails to replace the missing money at the root of the adequacy problem. Hogan’s energy-only market fills this gap. On the other track, the short-term capacity markets (ICAP) spawned long-term capacity …

Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …

Game Theory, David A. Weiskopf, James F. Nieberding, Susan C.S. Lee

David A Weiskopf

No abstract provided.

Investigation Of Predatory Practices In The Brazilian Beer Markets, Lucia H. Salgado, Alessandro V. Oliveira, Natalia S. Ferreira

Lucia Helena Salgado

This paper aims at making inference regarding the competitive conduct of beer manufacturers in Brazil and at investigating alleged predatory behavior in the market from data disaggregated at the brand level. By making use of the theoretical framework on predation and of the New Empirical Industrial Organization methodology, we propose a structural model of conduct, based on a game of Bertrand competition with product differentiation, in order to better represent rivalry among players in this important market. Final results revealed that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the dominant firm presented over-competitive conduct for some of its …

Challenges To The Effective Implementation Of Competition Policy In Regulated Sectors: The Case Of Telecommunications In Mexico, Oliver Solano, Rafael Del Villar, Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu

Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu