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- Licensing (3)
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- L1, L41 (2)
- L71 (2)
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- Competition (1)
- D23 (1)
- D4 (1)
- D71 (1)
- Imperfect contract enforcement (1)
- Innovation (1)
- Intellectual property; Licensing; Asymmetric information; Research and development (1)
- K21 (1)
- L1 (1)
- L10 (1)
- L41 (1)
- L44 (1)
- Market power (1)
- O34 (1)
- Patent pools (1)
- Raising rivals’ costs (1)
- Vertical integration (1)
Articles 1 - 24 of 24
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Licensing And Innovation With Imperfect Contract Enforcement, Richard J. Gilbert, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen
Licensing And Innovation With Imperfect Contract Enforcement, Richard J. Gilbert, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen
Richard J Gilbert
Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We explore the implications of weak enforcement of contractual commitments on the licensing conduct of firms and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty. Strictly positive per-unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. Although imperfect contract enforcement lowers the profits of the upstream firm, weak enforcement lowers prices, increase downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.
The Protected Profits Benchmark: A Refusal To Deal Metric?, Richard J. Gilbert
The Protected Profits Benchmark: A Refusal To Deal Metric?, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Competition Policy For Industry Standards, Richard J. Gilbert
Competition Policy For Industry Standards, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
This paper is a chapter in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics. The chapter surveys issues raised by the development of industry standards, whether accomplished through a formal standard setting committee structure or the activities of a single sponsor. The focus is on the tradeoff between the benefits from standards and possible costs that standards and the activity of standard development may impose on consumers. A particular focus is on the consequences of intellectual property rights for standards.
A World Without Intellectual Property?: Boldrin And Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Richard J. Gilbert
A World Without Intellectual Property?: Boldrin And Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Revising The Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons From The U.S. And The E.U. (With Daniel Rubinfeld), Richard J. Gilbert
Revising The Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons From The U.S. And The E.U. (With Daniel Rubinfeld), Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Efficient Division Of Profits From Complementary Innovations, Richard J. Gilbert
Efficient Division Of Profits From Complementary Innovations, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Deal Or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations, Richard J. Gilbert
Deal Or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
Owners of patents with claims that are essential to a standard may charge high royalties for the use of products that comply with the standard. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have addressed this concern by seeking to obtain commitments from participating patent owners to license their essential patents at terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). More recently, SSOs have considered joint negotiations by their members with patent owners to more clearly establish licensing terms before the standard issues. However joint negotiation may allow potential licensees to suppress royalty terms below a technology’s economic value. This paper advances an alternative proposal …
It Works For Mergers, Why Not For Finance? (With Aaron Edlin), Richard J. Gilbert
It Works For Mergers, Why Not For Finance? (With Aaron Edlin), Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
The Rising Tide Of Patent Damages, Richard J. Gilbert
The Rising Tide Of Patent Damages, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Ties That Bind: Policies To Promote (Good) Patent Pools, Richard J. Gilbert
Ties That Bind: Policies To Promote (Good) Patent Pools, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
The Essentialty Test For Patent Pools, Richard J. Gilbert
The Essentialty Test For Patent Pools, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Market Power In Us And Eu Electricity Generation, Richard J. Gilbert
Market Power In Us And Eu Electricity Generation, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Analytical Screens For Electricity Mergers (With David Newbery), Richard J. Gilbert
Analytical Screens For Electricity Mergers (With David Newbery), Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Injecting Innovation Into The Rule Of Reason: A Comment On Evans And Hylton, Richard J. Gilbert
Injecting Innovation Into The Rule Of Reason: A Comment On Evans And Hylton, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Innovation Markets After Genzyme/Novazyme, Richard J. Gilbert
Innovation Markets After Genzyme/Novazyme, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Holding Innovation To An Antitrust Standard, Richard J. Gilbert
Holding Innovation To An Antitrust Standard, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Product Improvement And Technological Tying In A Winner-Take-All Market, Richard J. Gilbert, Michael H. Riordan
Product Improvement And Technological Tying In A Winner-Take-All Market, Richard J. Gilbert, Michael H. Riordan
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Market Power, Vertical Integration, And The Wholesale Price Of Gasoline, Richard J. Gilbert, Justine S. Hastings
Market Power, Vertical Integration, And The Wholesale Price Of Gasoline, Richard J. Gilbert, Justine S. Hastings
Richard J Gilbert
This paper empirically examines the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices. We use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in West Coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals’ costs. Research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices, controlling for horizontal market structure, cost shocks and trends. We find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors’ input costs and conclude that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices.
Dollars For Genes: Revenue Generation By The California Institute For Regenerative Medicine, Richard J. Gilbert
Dollars For Genes: Revenue Generation By The California Institute For Regenerative Medicine, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
Proponents of the $3 billion ballot initiative that created the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) forecast that CIRM-funded research would earn royalty income in the range of $537 million to $1.1 billion. Using data on past licensing revenues as well as expected discoveries, this paper estimates that CIRM licensing income will be only a few percent of expenditures and California’s share of this licensing income will be less than one percent of R&D expenditures in current dollars. The allocation of these relatively small revenues is of secondary importance to the greater objective of disseminating CIRM-funded stem cell technology quickly …
Competition And Innovation, Richard J. Gilbert
Competition And Innovation, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Competition Policy For Intellectual Property; Balancing Competition And Reward, Richard J. Gilbert
Competition Policy For Intellectual Property; Balancing Competition And Reward, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Should Good Patents Come In Small Packages? A Welfare Analysis Of Intellectual Property Bundling, Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz
Should Good Patents Come In Small Packages? A Welfare Analysis Of Intellectual Property Bundling, Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz
Richard J Gilbert
Intellectual property owners often hold the rights to several patents, each of which is essential to make or use a product. We compare the welfare properties of package licenses, under which a licensee pays the same fee regardless of the number of technologies licensed, with component licenses, under which each technology is licensed separately and there is no quantity discount. A central finding is that a long-term package license can induce incentives to invent around patents and invest in complementary assets that are closer to their socially optimal levels than are those induced by a long-term component license. We also …
Competition And Innovation, Richard J. Gilbert
Competition And Innovation, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Antitrust For Patent Pools: A Century Of Policy Evolution, Richard J. Gilbert
Antitrust For Patent Pools: A Century Of Policy Evolution, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
This paper reviews the antitrust treatment of patent-pooling and cross-licensing arrangements from E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., decided in 1902, to the recent Department of Justice business review letters on the MPEG and DVD patent pools. I examine the factors that the courts identified as pertinent to the antitrust outcome and compare them to the competitive factors identified in the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. Until recently, the competitive relationship of the patents was not a major determinant of the antitrust outcome in most cases. Instead, the courts have focused on restrictive licensing …