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Three Essays On Random Mechanism Design, Huaxia Zeng
Three Essays On Random Mechanism Design, Huaxia Zeng
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible preferences. Every voter reports a preference in the domain; a preference profile is generated; and the social lottery then is determined by a Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF). This dissertation focuses on RSCFs which provide every voter incentives to truthfully reveal her preference, and hence follows the formulation of strategyproofness in [26] which requires …