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Individualism, Collectivism, And Trade, Aidin Hajikhameneh, Erik O. Kimbrough

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

While economists recognize the important role of formal institutions in the promotion of trade, there is increasing agreement that institutions are typically endogenous to culture, making it difficult to disentangle their separate contributions. Lab experiments that assign institutions exogenously and measure and control individual cultural characteristics can allow for clean identification of the effects of institutions, conditional on culture, and help us understand the relationship between behavior and culture, under a given institutional framework. We focus on cultural tendencies toward individualism/collectivism, which social psychologists highlight as an important determinant of many behavioral differences across groups and people. We design an …

Information Transmission And The Oral Tradition: Evidence Of A Late-Life Service Niche For Tsimane Amerindians, Eric Schniter, Nathaniel T. Wilcox, Bret A. Beheim, Hillard S. Kaplan, Michael Gurven

ESI Publications

Storytelling can affect wellbeing and fitness by transmitting information and reinforcing cultural codes of conduct. Despite their potential importance, the development and timing of storytelling skills, and the transmission of story knowledge have received minimal attention in studies of subsistence societies that more often focus on food production skills. Here we examine how storytelling and patterns of information transmission among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists are predicted by the changing age profiles of storytellers’ abilities and accumulated experience. We find that storytelling skills are most developed among older adults who demonstrate superior knowledge of traditional stories and who report telling stories most. We …

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior In Sequential And Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests, Shakun D. Mago, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New Hampshire Effect, we find that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) expenditure than simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-expenditure in all battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as two complementary explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence.

Poverty Mapping Using Convolutional Neural Networks Trained On High And Medium Resolution Satellite Images, With An Application In Mexico, Boris Babenko, Jonathan Hersh, David Newhouse, Anusha Ramakrishnan, Tom Swartz

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Mapping the spatial distribution of poverty in developing countries remains an important and costly challenge. These “poverty maps” are key inputs for poverty targeting, public goods provision, political accountability, and impact evaluation, that are all the more important given the geographic dispersion of the remaining bottom billion severely poor individuals. In this paper we train Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to estimate poverty directly from high and medium resolution satellite images. We use both Planet and Digital Globe imagery with spatial resolutions of 3-5 m2 and 50 cm2 respectively, covering all 2 million km2 of Mexico. Benchmark poverty estimates come from …

Who’S Holding Out? An Experimental Study Of The Benefits And Burdens Of Eminent Domain, Abel Winn, Matthew W. Mccarter

ESI Publications

A substantial literature identifies seller holdout as a serious obstacle to land assembly, implying that eminent domain is an appropriate policy response. We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to test this view. We find that when there is no competition and no eminent domain, land assembly suffers from costly delay and failed assembly: participants lose 18.8% of the available surplus on average. Much of the inefficiency is due to low offers from the buyers (“buyer holdout”) rather than strategic holdout among sellers. When buyers can exercise eminent domain the participants lose 19.4% of the surplus on average. This loss …

Information (Non)Aggregation In Markets With Costly Signal Acquisition, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders’ acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset’s value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy …

The Welfare Effects Of Civil Forfeiture, Michael Preciado, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

Using a laboratory experiment we explore competing claims on the welfare effects of civil forfeiture. Experiment participants are tasked with making trade-offs in allocating resources “to fight crime” with and without the ability to seize and forfeit assets. It is an open question whether the societal impact of reducing crime is greater in a world with or without civil forfeiture. Proponents of civil forfeiture argue that the ill-gotten gains of criminals can be used by law enforcement to further fight crime. Opponents claim that the confiscation of assets by law enforcement distorts the prioritization of cases by focusing attention, not …

No Mere Tautology: The Division Of Labor Is Limited By The Division Of Labor, Andrew Smyth, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

We explore the intersection of growth theory and the theory of the firm with an experiment. Economic growth is possible in our experiment when agents specialize to exploit increasing returns. We find that low opportunity costs are sufficient for Marshallian internal economies, but that Marshallian external economies are slow to emerge in four probing treatment conditions. Transaction costs do not hamper external economies as we anticipated prior to collecting data. When external economies falter, it is because new ideas about the cost and value of more extensive specialization fail to emerge. Ideas are what make further divisions of the …

The Attack And Defense Of Weakest Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled — specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla-warfare” strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most one target with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in …

Loss Aversion And The Quantity-Quality Tradeoff, Jared Rubin, Anya Samek, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from …

A Reexamination Of “The Hidden Return To Incentives”, Jing Davis, Steven Schwartz, Richard Young

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.

Human And Monkey Responses In A Symmetric Game Of Conflict With Asymmetric Equilibria, Sarah F. Brosnan, Sara A. Price, Kelly Leverett, Laurent Prétôt, Michael Beran, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

To better understand the evolutionary history of human decision-making, we compare human behavior to that of two monkey species in a symmetric game of conflict with two asymmetric equilibria. While all of these species routinely make decisions in the context of social cooperation and competition, they have different socio-ecologies, which leads to different predictions about how they will respond. Our prediction was that anti-matching would be more difficult than matching in a symmetric coordination with simultaneous moves. To our surprise, not only do rhesus macaques frequently play one asymmetric Nash equilibrium, but so do capuchin monkeys, whose play in the …

Historical Cost And Conservatism Are Joint Adaptations That Help Identify Opportunity Cost, Sudipta Basu, Gregory B. Waymire

ESI Publications

Braun (The ecological rationality of historical costs and conservatism. Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, this issue) argues that the traditional accounting principles underlying the revenue-expense approach such as Historical Cost and Conservatism are ecologically rational in that they help organizations survive better in uncertain economic environments. More importantly, Braun argues that the revenue-expense approach generates new private information, which informs markets and makes them more effective (Hayek, 1945, The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530), as opposed to merely reflecting back market data under the asset-liability approach (e.g. Sunder, 2011, IFRS monopoly: …

Exchange In The Absence Of Legal Enforcement: Reputation And Multilateral Punishment Under Uncertainty, Aidin Hajikhameneh, Jared Rubin

ESI Working Papers

Prinicpal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution to mitigate this problem is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is uncertainty regarding whether an agent actually cheated or was just the victim of bad luck? And how might such uncertainty be mitigated—or exacerbated—by nonobservable, pro-social behavioral characteristics? We address these questions by designing a simple modified trust game with uncertainty and the capacity for principals to employ multilateral punishment. We find that a modest amount of uncertainty …

Experimenting With Contests For Experimentation, Cary Deck, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Publications

We report an experimental test of alternative rules in innovation contests when success may not be feasible and contestants may learn from each other. Following Halac, Kartik, and Liu (in press), the contest designer can vary the prize allocation rule from Winner‐Take‐All (WTA) in which the first successful innovator receives the entire prize to Shared in which all successful innovators during the contest duration share in the prize. The designer can also vary the information disclosure policy from Public in which at each period, all information about contestants' past successes and failures is publicly available, to Private, in which contestants …

How Product Innovation Can Affect Price Collusion, Andrew Smyth

ESI Working Papers

Price conspiracies appear endemic in many markets. This paper conjectures that low expected returns from product innovation can affect price collusion in certain markets. This conjecture is tested—and supported—by both archival and experimental data. In particular, average market prices in low innovation experiments are significantly greater than those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments, because price collusion is more successful in the low innovation experiments.

The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The defender’s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. Although there are multiple equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the allocations of forces across targets that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy in which a single random network is attacked.

Equilibrium Play In Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

One robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play the game. Motivated by Adam Smith’s proposition that beneficence—like that of non‐ equilibrium play in the ultimatum game—cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe high rates of equilibrium play with highly unequal splits when responders choose to play such ultimatum games with both fixed and variable sums.

War And Conflict In Economics: Theories, Applications, And Recent Trends, Erik O. Kimbrough, Kevin Laughren, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges.

Informed Entry In Auctions, Diego Aycinena, Hernán Bejerano, Lucas Rentschler

ESI Publications

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.

Bondholder Reorganization Of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Steven Gjerstad

ESI Working Papers

This paper describes a resolution process for faltering financial firms that quickly allocates losses to bondholders and transfers ownership of the firm to them. This process overcomes the most serious flaws in resolution plans submitted by banks under Dodd-Frank Title I and in the FDIC receivership procedure in Dodd-Frank Title II by restoring the balance sheet of a failing financial institution and immediately replacing the management and board of directors who allowed its demise. In almost all bank failures, this process would eliminate the need for government involvement beyond court certification of the reorganization. The procedure overcomes the serious incentive …

Sentiments, Conduct, And Trust In The Laboratory, Vernon Smith, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

In this essay we provide a brief account and interpretation of The Theory of Moral Sentiments showing that it departs fundamentally from contemporary patterns of thought in economics that are believed to govern individual behavior in small groups, and contains strong testable propositions governing the expression of that behavior. We also state a formal representation of the model for individual choice of action, apply the propositions to the prediction of actions in trust games, report two experiments testing these predictions, and interpret the results in terms directly related to the model. In short, we argue that the system of sociability …

Sleep Restriction And Circadian Effects On Social Decisions, David L. Dickinson, Todd Mcelroy

ESI Publications

Our study examines how chronic sleep restriction and suboptimal times-of-day affect decisions in a classic set of social tasks. We experimentally manipulate and objectively measured sleep in 184 young-adult subjects, who were also randomly assigned an early morning or late evening experiment session during which decision tasks were administered. Sleep restriction and suboptimal time-of-day are both estimated to either directly or indirectly (via an impact on sleepiness) reduce altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. We conclude that commonly experienced adverse sleep states, most notably chronic sleep restriction, significantly reduce prosocial behaviors, and can therefore limit benefits from short-term social interactions.

Emotions And Behavior Regulation In Decision Dilemmas, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter

ESI Publications

We introduce a dynamic model of emotional behavior regulation that can generalize to a wide range of decision dilemmas. Dilemmas are characterized by availability of mutually exclusive goals that a decision maker is dually motivated to pursue. In our model, previous goal pursuant decisions produce negative emotions that regulate an individual’s propensity to further pursue those goals at future times. This emotional regulation of behavior helps explain the non-stationarity and switching observed between so-called “preferences” revealed in repeated decision dilemmas (e.g., by choosing A over B at time 1, then choosing B over A at time 2). We also explain …

On Private Governance, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

Edward Peter Stringham’s book Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life (2015) is a compelling defense of the proposition that private governance is more widely used and more effective than most people think. Stringham looks to history to see how people solved problems of fraud and cheating without government intervention and provides example after compelling example to contradict the strong claim that a government or any third-party enforcer is necessary for voluntary exchange. While Stringham doesn’t take on the tough problem that private governance is not sufficient for its task, his book is intended to be the beginning, …

How We Think About Economics, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Publications

"From my casual observation, many economists were surprised at the content of Vernon's Nobel lecture on ecological and constructivist rationality in economics. Having been awarded the prize 'for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms,' I think many expected him to catalogue the major findings of experimental economics in his prize lecture. David Porter has described Vernon as a live, interactive version of the Journal of Economic Literature. But Vernon Smith is no cataloguer. He is a synthesizer, and he synthesizes acutely aware that scientific inquiry is …

Optimized Forecasting Of Dominant U.S. Stock Market Equities Using Univariate And Multivariate Time Series Analysis Methods, Michael Schwartz

Computational and Data Sciences Theses

This dissertation documents an investigation into forecasting U.S. stock market equities via two very different time series analysis techniques: 1) autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), and 2) singular spectrum analysis (SSA). Approximately 40% of the S&P 500 stocks are analyzed. Forecasts are generated for one and five days ahead using daily closing prices. Univariate and multivariate structures are applied and results are compared. One objective is to explore the hypothesis that a multivariate model produces superior performance over a univariate configuration. Another objective is to compare the forecasting performance of ARIMA to SSA, as SSA is a relatively recent development …

Gender, Punishment, And Cooperation: Men Hurt Others To Advance Their Interests, Terence C. Burnham

ESI Working Papers

A laboratory experiment that reports on gender, cooperation, and punishment in two repeated public goods game using high-powered punishment. In a repeated public goods game with punishment, no statistically significant differences between men and women are reported. In a modified game that adds an explicit payoff for relative performance, men punish more than women, men obtain higher rank, and punishment by males decreases payoffs for both men and for women. These results contribute to the debate about the origins and maintenance of cooperation.

Comparing A Risky Choice In The Field And Across Lab Procedures, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova

ESI Publications

Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues regarding the reliability of such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. The second pertains to the impact the payment procedure has on observed behavior. This paper adds empirical insight into both issues. Using data from the promotional campaign of a bank and a laboratory experiment that closely mimics the same decision, we find similar levels of risk taking controlling for gender and age. We also compare behavior on this same risky choice across three …

Coronary Atherosclerosis In Indigenous South American Tsimane: A Cross-Sectional Cohort Study, Hillard Kaplan, Randall C. Thompson, Benjamin C. Trumble, L. Samuel Wann, Adel H. Allam, Bret Beheim, Bruno Frohlich, M. Linda Sutherland, James D. Sutherland, Jonathan Stieglitz, Daniel Eid Rodriguez, David E. Michalik, Chris J. Rowan, Guido P. Lombardi, Ram Bedi, Angela R. Garcia, James K. Min, Jagat Narula, Caleb E. Finch, Michael Gurven, Gregory S. Thomas

ESI Publications

Background—Conventional coronary artery disease risk factors might potentially explain at least 90% of the attributable risk of coronary artery disease. To better understand the association between the pre-industrial lifestyle and low prevalence of coronary artery disease risk factors, we examined the Tsimane, a Bolivian population living a subsistence lifestyle of hunting, gathering, fishing, and farming with few cardiovascular risk factors, but high infectious inflammatory burden.

Methods—We did a cross-sectional cohort study including all individuals who self-identified as Tsimane and who were aged 40 years or older. Coronary atherosclerosis was assessed by coronary artery calcium (CAC) scoring done with …