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The Challenge Of Adverse Selection To Domestic Seafood Markets In Vietnam: Assessing Consumer Demand And Supply-Side Policy Options, Eliot Martin Apr 2016

The Challenge Of Adverse Selection To Domestic Seafood Markets In Vietnam: Assessing Consumer Demand And Supply-Side Policy Options, Eliot Martin

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

The Vietnamese seafood industry has grown rapidly over the past few decades, largely rallying behind huge foreign demand. Institutions surrounding the production and processing of seafood for export have supported efforts to implement reliable regulations and eco-label certifications in line with demand for safe, environmentally friendly, and otherwise high quality products. No comparable efforts exist in the domestic market. Adverse selection is identified as the core problem with the lack of higher end goods on the domestic market, resulting from asymmetric information between producers and consumers, as well as moral hazard between actors in the supply chain. This study finds …


Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information, Yang Liu Jan 2016

Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information, Yang Liu

Wayne State University Dissertations

Theoretical models of insurance suggest that when individuals have private information about their risk type alone, insurance coverage will be adversely selected by those riskier individuals due to asymmetric information. In this study we investigate whether individuals have private information of their risk type and riskier individuals are indeed more likely to choose health insurance in the context of Medigap insurance market in the United States where government intervention reinforces information asymmetry. Medigap is supplemental private insurance that optional to those who have Medicare Part A and Part B and it is used to cover some of the cost sharing …


Disentangling Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection In Private Health Insurance, David Powell, Dana Goldman Dec 2015

Disentangling Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection In Private Health Insurance, David Powell, Dana Goldman

David Powell

Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets and understanding the relative importance of each factor is critical for policy.   We use claims data from a large firm which changed health insurance plan options to isolate moral hazard from plan selection.  Using an instrumental variables quantile regression approach, we estimate the differential causal impact of each health insurance plan on the entire distribution of medical expenditures.  We account for systematic sample attrition during the sample period by conditioning on a nonseparable sample selection adjustment.   Our estimates imply that 54% of the additional medical spending …