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Mechanisms Study: Using Game Theory To Assess The Effects Of Social Norms And Social Networks On Adolescent Smoking In Schools—Study Protocol, Ruth F. Hunter, Felipe Montes, Jennifer M. Murray, Sharon C. Sanchez-Franco, Shannon C. Montgomery, Joaquín Jaramillo, Christopher Tate, Rajnish Kumar, Laura Dunne, Abhijit Ramalingam, Erik O. Kimbrough, Erin Krupka, Huiyu Zhou, Laurence Moore, Linda Bauld, Blanca Llorente, Olga L. Sarmiento, Frank Kee
Mechanisms Study: Using Game Theory To Assess The Effects Of Social Norms And Social Networks On Adolescent Smoking In Schools—Study Protocol, Ruth F. Hunter, Felipe Montes, Jennifer M. Murray, Sharon C. Sanchez-Franco, Shannon C. Montgomery, Joaquín Jaramillo, Christopher Tate, Rajnish Kumar, Laura Dunne, Abhijit Ramalingam, Erik O. Kimbrough, Erin Krupka, Huiyu Zhou, Laurence Moore, Linda Bauld, Blanca Llorente, Olga L. Sarmiento, Frank Kee
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This proof of concept study harnesses novel transdisciplinary insights to contrast two school-based smoking prevention interventions among adolescents in the UK and Colombia. We compare schools in these locations because smoking rates and norms are different, in order to better understand social norms based mechanisms of action related to smoking. We aim to: (1) improve the measurement of social norms for smoking behaviors in adolescents and reveal how they spread in schools; (2) to better characterize the mechanisms of action of smoking prevention interventions in schools, learning lessons for future intervention research. The A Stop Smoking in Schools Trial (ASSIST) …
Game-Theoretic Foundations Of Monetary Equilibrium, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
Game-Theoretic Foundations Of Monetary Equilibrium, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
According to theory, money supports trade in a world without enforcement and, in particular, in large societies, where gift-exchange is unsustainable. It is demonstrated that, in fact, monetary equilibrium breaks down in the absence of adequate enforcement institutions and it collapses as societies that lack external enforcement grow large. This unique result is derived by unveiling the existence of a tacit enforcement assumption in the literature that explains the advantages from monetary exchange, and by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games and social norms.
A Tractable Analysis Of Contagious Equilibria, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
A Tractable Analysis Of Contagious Equilibria, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes.
Binding Promises And Cooperation Among Strangers, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Binding Promises And Cooperation Among Strangers, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
Experimental Markets With Frictions, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Experimental Markets With Frictions, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Decentralized and impersonal exchange is fundamental to contemporary economies, where many interactions take place among individuals with low levels of information about their counterpart. We review the experimental literature about markets with frictions, where strangers interact in pairs formed at random in economies of indefinite duration. We focus on the impact of communication on the efficiency of the outcome and report results of a new experiment.
Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello
Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This article explores the Monetary Models.