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A Survey Of Experimental Research On Contests, All-Pay Auctions And Tournaments, Emmanuel Dechenaux, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
A Survey Of Experimental Research On Contests, All-Pay Auctions And Tournaments, Emmanuel Dechenaux, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, …
The Herodotus Paradox, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
The Herodotus Paradox, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the 'Herodotus paradox.'
The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations …