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Wage Inequality And Skill Asymmetries, Peter Skott, Paul Auerbach Jul 2003

Wage Inequality And Skill Asymmetries, Peter Skott, Paul Auerbach

Peter Skott

Using a simple model with two levels of skill, we assume that high skill workers who fail to get high skill jobs may accept low skill positions; low skill workers do not have the analogous option of filling high skill position. This asymmetry implies that an adverse, skill neutral shock to aggregate employment may cause an increase in wage inequality, both between and within skill categories, as well as an increase in unemployment, especially among low skill workers. Movements in productivity, unemployment and inequality may thus be linked to induced overeducation and credentialism.


The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact Of Destructive Product Market Competition And Impatient Finance On Nonfinancial Corporations In The Neoliberal Era, James Crotty Jul 2003

The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact Of Destructive Product Market Competition And Impatient Finance On Nonfinancial Corporations In The Neoliberal Era, James Crotty

James Crotty

No abstract provided.


Food Safety: What Is Economists’ Value Added?, Julie Caswell Jun 2003

Food Safety: What Is Economists’ Value Added?, Julie Caswell

Julie Caswell

Economists are contributing to the food safety arena by analyzing demand for food safety, the consumer level benefits of improved food safety, the costs and benefits to companies from quality assurance for food safety, and the benefits and costs of government regulations aimed at improving food safety. In the food safety area, too much attention has been paid to risk assessment and not enough to risk management. Economists have a very important role to play in improving private and public risk management in areas such as pathogen reduction, use of traceability, and biotechnology.


Do Public Expendintures Improve Child Outcomes In The U.S.: A Comparison Across Fifty States, Nancy Folbre, Kristen Harknett, Irwin Garfinkel, Jay Bainbridge, Timothy Smeeding Mar 2003

Do Public Expendintures Improve Child Outcomes In The U.S.: A Comparison Across Fifty States, Nancy Folbre, Kristen Harknett, Irwin Garfinkel, Jay Bainbridge, Timothy Smeeding

Nancy Folbre

Our paper utilizes variation across the fifty U.S. states to examine the relationship between public expenditures on children and child outcomes. We find that public expenditures on children are related to better child outcomes across a wide range of indicators including measures of child mortality, elementary-school test scores, and adolescent behavioral outcomes. States that spend more on children have better child outcomes even after taking into account potential confounding influences. Our results are robust to numerous variations in model specifications and to the inclusion of proxies for unobserved characteristics of states. Our sensitivity analyses suggest that the results we present …


Distributional Consequences Of Neutral Shocks To Economic Activity In A Model With Efficiency Wages And Overeducation, Peter Skott Jan 2003

Distributional Consequences Of Neutral Shocks To Economic Activity In A Model With Efficiency Wages And Overeducation, Peter Skott

Peter Skott

This paper shows that the existence and persistence of `overeducation' can be explained by a simple extension of the efficiency wage model. When calibrated to fit the amounts of overeducation found in most empirical studies, the model implies that both the relative wage and the relative employment rate of high-skill workers will depend inversely on the aggregate level of activity. The model may help explain the patterns of rising wage inequality that have been observed in many countries since the early 1970s.


The Importance Of Setting The Agenda, Peter Skott, Manfred Holler Jan 2003

The Importance Of Setting The Agenda, Peter Skott, Manfred Holler

Peter Skott

Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant