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Articles 1 - 30 of 41
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
No Balancing For Anticonstitutional Government Conduct, Bruce Ledewitz
No Balancing For Anticonstitutional Government Conduct, Bruce Ledewitz
Law Faculty Publications
Noted Supreme Court critic Eric Segall has been criticizing the majority opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen for its failure to engage in any kind of means-end balancing in striking down a New York gun control measure--balancing that he argues the Court has engaged in since the Reconstruction era. Segall is hardly the only American law professor to level this charge. But the lack of balancing in Bruen is neither unprecedented nor methodologically innovative. It certainly does not reflect a victory of originalism. Instead, the Bruen decision stands firmly in the tradition that courts do …
Holmes V. Walton And Its Enduring Lessons For Originalism, Justin W. Aimonetti
Holmes V. Walton And Its Enduring Lessons For Originalism, Justin W. Aimonetti
Marquette Law Review
Originalism is nothing new. And the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1780 decision in Holmes v. Walton shows it. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court disallowed a state law as repugnant to the state constitution because the law permitted a jury of only six to render a judgment. To reach that result, the court looked to the fixed, original meaning of the jury trial guarantee embedded in the state constitution, and it then constrained its interpretive latitude in conformity with that fixed meaning. Holmes thus cuts against the common misconception that originalism as an interpretive methodology is a modern …
The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum
The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.
This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …
A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest
A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest
Maine Law Review
Justice Scalia's engaging essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” and the four comments it provokes, should provide lawyers, judges, and other lawmakers with an interesting evening. Instead of presenting a theoretical view of the role of the federal courts in interpretation, Justice Scalia sketches out a case for “textualism.” “Textualism” is one of several currently contending methods of interpreting statutes and the United States Constitution, and is currently popular among federal judges who see their role as restricting government's powers to those expressly stated in the …
Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer
Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968. The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. This Article constitutes the first such comprehensive exploration.
The Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968. It then presents a census of the 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania Constitutional rights under the Constitution of 1968.
Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:
1. Exercise of independent constitutional …
Comparative Approaches To Constitutional History, Jamal Greene, Yvonne Tew
Comparative Approaches To Constitutional History, Jamal Greene, Yvonne Tew
Faculty Scholarship
An historical approach to constitutional interpretation draws upon original intentions or understandings of the meaning or application of a constitutional provision. Comparing the ways in which courts in different jurisdictions use history is a complex exercise. In recent years, academic and judicial discussion of “originalism” has obscured both the global prevalence of resorting to historical materials as an interpretive resource and the impressive diversity of approaches courts may take to deploying those materials. This chapter seeks, in Section B, to develop a basic taxonomy of historical approaches. Section C explores in greater depth the practices of eight jurisdictions with constitutional …
The Gibbons Fallacy, Richard A. Primus
The Gibbons Fallacy, Richard A. Primus
Articles
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote that "the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated." Modern courts use that phrase to mean that the Constitutions enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers are, as a whole, less than a grant of general legislative authority. But Marshall wasn't saying that. He wasn't talking about the Constitution's overall enumeration of congressional powers at all. He was writing about a different enumeration - the enumeration of three classes of commerce within the Commerce Clause. And Marshall's analysis of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons does not imply that the enumerated …
The English Fire Courts And The American Right To Civil Jury Trial, Jay Tidmarsh
The English Fire Courts And The American Right To Civil Jury Trial, Jay Tidmarsh
Journal Articles
This Article uncovers the history of a long-forgotten English court system, the “fire courts,” which Parliament established to resolve dispute between landlords and tenants in urban areas destroyed in catastrophic fires. One of the fire courts’ remarkable features was the delegation of authority to judges to adjudicate disputes without juries. Because the Seventh Amendment’s right to a federal civil jury trial depends in part on the historical practice of English courts in 1791, this delegation bears directly on the present power of Congress to abrogate the use of juries in federal civil litigation.
Parliament enacted fire-courts legislation on eight occasions …
Why Enumeration Matters, Richard A. Primus
Why Enumeration Matters, Richard A. Primus
Michigan Law Review
The maxim that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers can be understood as a “continuity tender”: not a principle with practical consequences for governance, but a ritual statement with which practitioners identify themselves with a history from which they descend. This interpretation makes sense of the longstanding paradox whereby courts recite the enumeration principle but give it virtually no practical effect. On this understanding, the enumerated-powers maxim is analogous to the clause that Parliament still uses to open enacted statutes: “Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty.” That text might imply that the Queen is …
Newsroom: Logan On Justice Scalia's Vitriol, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Newsroom: Logan On Justice Scalia's Vitriol, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Life of the Law School (1993- )
No abstract provided.
Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Michigan Law Review
The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, for judges to achieve “sensible” resolutions of real-world disputes—by which Judge Posner means “in a way that can be explained in ordinary language and justified as consistent with the expectations of normal people” (p. 354)—they must be able to navigate the world’s complexity successfully. To apply legal rules correctly and (where judicial lawmaking is called for) to formulate legal rules prudently, judges must understand the causal mechanisms and processes that undergird complex systems, and they must be able to draw sound factual …
Paths Of Resistance To Our Imperial First Amendment, Bertrall L. Ross Ii
Paths Of Resistance To Our Imperial First Amendment, Bertrall L. Ross Ii
Michigan Law Review
In the campaign finance realm, we are in the age of the imperial First Amendment. Over the past nine years, litigants bringing First Amendment claims against campaign finance regulations have prevailed in every case in the Supreme Court. A conservative core of five justices has developed virtually categorical protections for campaign speech and has continued to expand those protections into domains that states once had the authority to regulate. As the First Amendment’s empire expands, other values give way. Four key cases from this era illustrate the reach of this imperial First Amendment. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. …
International Norms In Constitutional Law, Michael Wells
International Norms In Constitutional Law, Michael Wells
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
The Use Of International Sources In Constitutional Opinion, Daniel Bodansky
The Use Of International Sources In Constitutional Opinion, Daniel Bodansky
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
From Commonwealth To Constitutional Limitations: Thomas Cooley's Michigan, 1805-1886, Robert Allan Olender
From Commonwealth To Constitutional Limitations: Thomas Cooley's Michigan, 1805-1886, Robert Allan Olender
SJD Dissertations
In response to what he perceived as the challenges associated with republican governance in the later portions of the nineteenth century, Michigan’s Thomas McIntyre Cooley penned his treatise concerning constitutional limitations on legislative power. In it, Cooley offered a vision of government where courts would check government power and would raise constitutional barriers against the impact of improper influences on legislators. As a student of history, Cooley grounded his beliefs and doctrines in experience, not philosophical reflections. Believing that “the fruits of speculative genius in government are of little value,” Cooley submitted that governing structures and law “must be the …
Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen
Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen
Book Chapters
If the Supreme Court mythologizes Blackstone, it is equally true that Blackstone himself was engaged in something of a mythmaking project. Far from a neutral reporter, Blackstone has some stories to tell, in particular the story of the hero law. The problems associated with using the Commentaries as a transparent window on eighteenth-century American legal norms, however, do not make Blackstone’s text irrelevant today. The chapter concludes with my brief reading of the Commentaries as a critical mirror of some twenty-first-century legal and social structures. That analysis draws on a long-term project, in which I am making my way through …
Democracy And Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection And The Evolving Judicial Conception Of Politics, Bertrall L. Ross
Democracy And Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection And The Evolving Judicial Conception Of Politics, Bertrall L. Ross
Bertrall L Ross
Judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause have undergone a major transformation over the last fifty years. A Supreme Court once suspicious of the democratic losses of discrete and insular minorities, now closely scrutinizes their democratic victories. A Court once active in structuring the democratic process to be inclusive of racial and other minorities, now views minority representation in the political process as essentially irrelevant. A Court once deferential to exercises of congressional power that enhanced the equal protection rights of minorities, now gives Congress much less leeway.
What explains these shifts? An easy explanation is that the Supreme Court …
Justice Kennedy's Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, Stephanos Bibas
Justice Kennedy's Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, Stephanos Bibas
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay, written as part of a symposium on the evolution of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, surveys three areas of criminal procedure under the Sixth Amendment: sentence enhancements, the admissibility of hearsay, and the regulation of defense counsel’s responsibilities. In each area, Justice Kennedy has been a notable voice of pragmatism, focusing not on bygone analogies to the eighteenth century but on a hard-headed appreciation of the twenty-first. He has shown sensitivity to modern criminal practice, prevailing professional norms, and practical constraints, as befits a Justice who came to the bench with many years of private-practice experience. His touchstone is not …
The Third Annual William French Smith Memorial Lecture: A Conversation With Retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Sandra Day O'Connor, Kenneth W. Starr, Carol A. Chase, Colleen Graffy, Virginia Milstead
The Third Annual William French Smith Memorial Lecture: A Conversation With Retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Sandra Day O'Connor, Kenneth W. Starr, Carol A. Chase, Colleen Graffy, Virginia Milstead
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell
Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell
Michigan Law Review
Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Constitution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances …
Two Kinds Of Plain Meaning, Victoria Nourse
Two Kinds Of Plain Meaning, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Is plain meaning so plain? This is not meant to be a philosophical question, but one deserving serious legal analysis. The plain-meaning rule claims to provide certainty and narrow statutes' domains. The author agrees with, as a relative claim, comparing plain meaning with purposivism. She does not agree that plain-meaning analysis is as easy as its proponents suggest. In this piece, the author teases out two very different ideas of plain meaning--ordinary/popular meaning and expansive/legalist meaning--suggesting that doctrinal analysis requires more than plain-meaning simpliciter. Perhaps more importantly, she argues that plain meaning, as legalist meaning, can quite …
Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley
Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A response to John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003 (2009). Professor John Manning's analysis of the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions works as a platform to further the cause of textualism. His argument fails to persuade, however, because the textualism he says the Court should embrace in federalism cases is antithetical to the atextual nature of the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation. Manning prefaces his work by telling readers that his analysis is not an end in itself. His aim, rather, is to "use the methodology" the …
Against Textualism, William Michael Treanor
Against Textualism, William Michael Treanor
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Modern textualists have assumed that careful attention to constitutional text is the key to the recovery of the Constitution's original public meaning. This article challenges that assumption by showing the importance of nontextual factors in early constitutional interpretation. The Founding generation consistently relied on structural concerns, policy, ratifiers' and drafters' intent, and broad principles of government. To exclude such nontextual factors from constitutional interpretation is to depart from original public meaning because the Founders gave these factors great weight in ascertaining meaning. Moreover, for a modern judge seeking to apply original public meaning, the threshold question is not simply; "How …
Judicial Activism And Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Claims: The Allure Of Originalism And The Unappreciated Promise Of Constrained Nonoriginalism, Daniel O. Conkle
Judicial Activism And Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Claims: The Allure Of Originalism And The Unappreciated Promise Of Constrained Nonoriginalism, Daniel O. Conkle
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Among other meanings, "judicial activism" can be defined as judicial decisionmaking that frustrates majoritarian self-government and that is unconstrained by law. So understood, judicial activism is presumptively problematic, because it frustrates customary democratic and judicial norms.
In this essay, I address originalist and nonoriginalist responses to the presumptive problem of judicial activism in the context of Fourteenth Amendment privacy claims, including claims relating to abortion, sexual conduct, and same-sex marriage. I argue that originalism is an overrated solution, largely because current understandings of originalism, despite claims to the contrary, do not provide standards of decision that are sufficiently clear to …
The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence V. Texas, Brian Hawkins
The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence V. Texas, Brian Hawkins
Michigan Law Review
On their faces, Washington v. Glucksberg and Lawrence v. Texas seem to have little in common. In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting assisted suicide and rejected a claim that the Constitution protects a "right to die"; in Lawrence, the Court struck down a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy and embraced a claim that the Constitution protects homosexual persons' choices to engage in intimate relationships. Thus, in both subject matter and result, Lawrence and Glucksberg appear far apart. The Lawrence Court, however, faced a peculiar challenge in reaching its decision, and its response to that challenge brings …
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman
ExpressO
This is a review essay entitled “Using All Available Information,” in which I review and comment on Justice Stephen Breyer’s new book, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, published in September 2005. Justice Breyer’s book, adapted from the Tanner Lectures given in 2005 at Harvard Law School, serves partly as a response to Justice Scalia’s 1997 volume A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. I review Justice Breyer’s book in part by comparison to and contrast with Justice Scalia’s. I propose that much about Justice Breyer’s interpretive philosophy, which centers on determining the “purposes” of texts and interpreting …
The Riddle Of Hiram Revels, Richard A. Primus
The Riddle Of Hiram Revels, Richard A. Primus
Articles
In 1870, a black man named Hiram Revels was named to represent Mississippi in the Senate. Senate Democrats objected to seating him and pointed out that the Constitution specifies that no person may be a senator who has not been a citizen of the United States for at least nine years. Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Democrats argued, Revels had not been a citizen on account of the Supreme Court's 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Thus, even if Revels were a citizen in 1870, he had held that status for only two years. …
Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique Of The Sentencing Guidelines, Jackie Gardina
Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique Of The Sentencing Guidelines, Jackie Gardina
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article contends that the federal sentencing guidelines-whether mandatory or discretionary-violate the constitutional separation of powers by impermissibly interfering with a criminal jury's constitutional duty to act as a check against government overreaching. This Article posits that the inclusion of the criminal jury in Article III of the Constitution was intended as an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances. This Article also submits a proposal for restoring the constitutional balance through the creation of a "guideline jury system" within the current guideline structure. The implementation of a guideline jury system would fill the constitutional void created …
A Subversive Strand Of The Warren Court, Gary Peller
A Subversive Strand Of The Warren Court, Gary Peller
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court And The Power To "Say What The Law Is", Timothy Zick
Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court And The Power To "Say What The Law Is", Timothy Zick
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.