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The Sffa V. Harvard Trojan Horse Admissions Lawsuit, Kimberly West-Faulcon Jan 2024

The Sffa V. Harvard Trojan Horse Admissions Lawsuit, Kimberly West-Faulcon

Seattle University Law Review

Affirmative-action-hostile admissions lawsuits are modern Trojan horses. The SFFA v. Harvard/UNC case—Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina, et. al., decided jointly—is the most effective Trojan horse admissions lawsuit to date. Constructed to have the distractingly appealing exterior façade of a lawsuit seeking greater fairness in college admissions, the SFFA v. Harvard/UNC case is best understood as a deception-driven battle tactic used by forces waging a multi-decade war against the major legislative victories of America’s Civil Rights Movement, specifically Title VI and Title VII …


Ethics At The Speed Of Business, James A. Doppke Jr. Aug 2023

Ethics At The Speed Of Business, James A. Doppke Jr.

DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal

This paper discusses several ways in which the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, construct barriers that prevent lawyers and businesses from accomplishing reasonable commercial goals. Often, those barriers arise from outdated concepts, or terminology that does not reflect current business realities. The paper argues for the amendment of specific Rules to enhance lawyers’ and businesses’ respective abilities to conduct their affairs more efficiently, without sacrificing public protection in the process.


The Quixotic Search For Race-Neutral Alternatives, Michael E. Rosman Jul 2014

The Quixotic Search For Race-Neutral Alternatives, Michael E. Rosman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The Supreme Court has stated that the narrow-tailoring inquiry of the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny analysis of racially disparate treatment by state actors requires courts to consider whether the defendant seriously considered race-neutral alternatives before adopting the race-conscious program at issue. This article briefly examines what that means in the context of race-conscious admissions programs at colleges and universities. Part I sets forth the basic concepts that the Supreme Court uses to analyze race-conscious decision-making by governmental actors and describes the role of “race-neutral alternatives” in that scheme. Part II examines the nature of “race-neutral alternatives” and identifies its …


Fisher V. Texas: The Limits Of Exhaustion And The Future Of Race-Conscious University Admissions, John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian Jan 2014

Fisher V. Texas: The Limits Of Exhaustion And The Future Of Race-Conscious University Admissions, John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article investigates the potential ramifications of Fisher v. Texas and the future of race-conscious university admissions. Although one cannot predict the ultimate significance of the Fisher decision, its brief and pregnant statements of law portends an increasingly perilous course for traditional affirmative action programs. Part I explores the opinions filed in Fisher, with a particular emphasis on Justice Kennedy’s opinion on behalf of the Court. We focus on the ways in which the Fisher decision departs from precedent, proscribes new limits on the use of race in university admissions, and tightens requirements for narrow tailoring. Part II investigates the …


Grutter's Denouement: Three Templates From The Roberts Court, Ellen D. Katz Jan 2013

Grutter's Denouement: Three Templates From The Roberts Court, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

Precedent from the Roberts Court shows the Justices taking three distinct approaches to precedent they dislike. Each provides a template for the Court to criticize race-based affirmative action in higher education, as Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin is widely expected to do. Most narrowly, the Court might use Fisher to issue a warning, much like it did in 2009 when it sidestepped a constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act; under this approach, the opinion would spell out why the Justices think the diversity celebrated in Grutter v. Bollinger no longer provides sufficient justification for the use of …


Foxes Guarding The Chicken Coop: Intervention As Of Right And The Defense Of Civil Rights Remedies, Alan Jenkins Jan 1999

Foxes Guarding The Chicken Coop: Intervention As Of Right And The Defense Of Civil Rights Remedies, Alan Jenkins

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This article focuses on the recent spate of cases in which educational institutions on the grounds that their race-conscious admissions policies are unconstitutional. The author analyzes the role of minority students and organizations who are the beneficiaries of those polices at the defendant institutions and their recent attempts to intervene in the lawsuits pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the author argues that under the traditional interpretation of Rule 24(a); intervention of right should be granted to minority students and organizations in the great majority of instances. Second, the author looks at the reasons …


Minority Preferences In Law School Admissions, Terrance Sandalow Jan 1980

Minority Preferences In Law School Admissions, Terrance Sandalow

Book Chapters

In addressing the subject of "reverse discrimination," I want to caution at the outset against permitting the use of the word "discrimination" to prejudice consideration of the subject. "Discrimination" has, in recent years, become a bad word. It tends to be used as a shorthand for "unjustifiably unequal treatment." In its original and still proper meaning, however, the word is quite neutral. Discrimination merely means differentiation. It comes from a Latin word that means "to distinguish." Accordingly, when we discriminate-i.e., when we differentiate or distinguish-among people, the propriety of our action depends upon the reasons that we have acted as …