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Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb

Senior Honors Theses

In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14^th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the …

The Federal Question Jurisdiction Under Article Iii: “First In The Minds Of The Framers,” But Today, Perhaps, Falling Short Of The Framers’ Expectations, Arthur D. Hellman

Articles

As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “the primary motive” for creating a “judicial department” for the new national government was “the desire of having a [national] tribunal for the decision of all national questions.” Thus, although Article III of the Constitution lists nine kinds of “Cases” and “Controversies” to which the “judicial Power” of the United States “shall extend,” “the objects which stood first in the minds of the framers” were the cases “arising under” the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Today we refer to this as the federal question jurisdiction.

Of all federal question cases, the Framers …

Converse-Osborn: State Sovereign Immunity, Standing, And The Dog-Wagging Effect Of Article Iii, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“[T]he legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-constructed government, are co-extensive with each other . . . [T]he judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing any . . . law [which the Legislature may constitutionally make].” Chief Justice Marshall relied on this axiom in Osborn v. Bank of the United States to stress the breadth of the federal judicial power: The federal courts must have the potential power to adjudicate any claim based on any law Congress has the power to enact. In recent years, however, the axiom has sometimes operated in the opposite direction: …