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The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason Scott Johnston
The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason Scott Johnston
Michigan Law Review
Among attorneys, judges, and legal academics, there is virtual consensus that the widespread use by business firms of standard-form contracts in their dealings with consumers has completely eliminated bargaining in consumer contracts. I believe that this perception is false, that rather than precluding bargaining and negotiation, standard-form contracts in fact facilitate bargaining and are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance of cooperative relationships between firms and their customers. On this view, which I elaborate below, firms use clear and unconditional standard form contract terms not because they will insist upon those terms, but because they have given their …
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Boilerplate can be exciting. It is this, perhaps hard-to-swallow, proposition that the present analysis attempts to convey. Particularly in invoking the work of Thomas Schelling on the role of focal points in coordination games, it offers what can be characterized as a "strategic" theory of boilerplate, in which boilerplate plays an active, even aggressive, role.
Contrary to the relatively inert quality of boilerplate implied by conventional treatments in the legal literature, boilerplate may serve essential signaling and coordination functions in contract bargaining. In appropriate circumstances, its proposed usage may be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of a bargaining party, …
Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig
Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig
Journal Articles
This paper considers whether an amendment to state divorce laws that strengthens its joint custody preference operates as a traditional default rule, specifying what most divorcing couples would choose or as a penalty default rule the parties will attempt to contract around.
While the Oregon statutes that frame our discussion here, like most state laws, do not state an explicit preference for joint custody, shared custody is certainly encouraged by Section 107.179, which refers cases in which the parties cannot agree on joint custody to mediation and by Section 107.105, which requires the court to consider awarding custody jointly. In …
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
Michigan Law Review
That boilerplate is pervasive is hardly surprising. In a variety of ways, standardized terms in day-to-day contracts serve an essential cost-saving function. By this measure, one might expect less frequent reliance on boilerplate in high-value contracts among sophisticated parties. Yet standard terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the sophisticated. Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to craft comprehensive and detailed, but also particularized, contracts, such parties will commonly conclude agreements comprised heavily of traditional terms--contracting norms of a sort-rather than terms tailored to the distinct features of their particular bargain. Examples of seemingly suboptimal …