Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Parallel Contract, Aditi Bagchi
Parallel Contract, Aditi Bagchi
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article describes a new model of contract. In parallel contract, one party enters into a series of contracts with many similarly situated individuals on background terms that are presumptively identical. Parallel contracts depart from the classical model of contract in two fundamental ways. First, obligations are not robustly dyadic in that they are neither tailored to the two parties to a given agreement nor understood by those parties by way of communications with each other. Second, obligations are not fixed at a discrete moment of contract. Parallel contracts should be interpreted differently than agreements more consistent with the classic …
Coordinating In The Shadow Of The Law: Two Contextualized Tests Of The Focal Point Theory Of Legal Compliance, Richard H. Mcadams, Janice Nadler
Coordinating In The Shadow Of The Law: Two Contextualized Tests Of The Focal Point Theory Of Legal Compliance, Richard H. Mcadams, Janice Nadler
Faculty Working Papers
In situations where people have an incentive to coordinate their behavior, law can provide a framework for understanding and predicting what others are likely to do. According to the focal point theory of expressive law, the law's articulation of a behavior can sometimes create self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur. Existing theories of legal compliance emphasize the effect of sanctions or legitimacy; we argue that, in addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can also influence compliance simply by making one outcome salient. We tested this claim in two experiments where sanctions and legitimacy were held constant. Experiment 1 demonstrated that …
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
Articles
It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …
The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell
The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell
Faculty Scholarship
This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds.), surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four topic areas that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These areas include freedom of contract (i.e., the scope of private power to create binding obligations), formation of contracts (both the procedural mechanics of exchange, and rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract interpretation (what consequences follow when agreements are …
Contracts – Only With Consent, Ronald J. Mann
Contracts – Only With Consent, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
My friend and former colleague Omri Ben-Shahar has established a reputation for providing nuanced and well-grounded applications of economic analysis to important problems of contract law. In recent years, he has undertaken the ambitious task of exploring a significant topic at the boundary of contract law: liability for problems that arise out of efforts to form a contract. The essay to which I reply, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, is his second work on that topic, following his 2001 article with Lucian Bebchuk entitled Precontractual Reliance. Collectively, these pieces provide a comprehensive analysis …
...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett
...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II and IV, he responds to the criticisms of his consent theory of contract advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and Patterson object to the enterprise in which the author and others are engaging, and he explains why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate over default rules. Finally, in contrast, in Part III the author shows how Steven Burton's theory of default rules, which he finds most congenial, is …
The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett
The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of "gap-filling in the absence of consent" by showing how the concept of default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of consent. He accomplishes this by expanding and refining his analysis of a "consent theory of contract." The author proposes that the concept of default rules reveals consent to be operating at two distinct levels of contract theory. First, the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement of any default rules. Second, nested within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent also operates to …
Rational Bargaining Theory And Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, The Duty To Disclose, And Fraud, Randy E. Barnett
Rational Bargaining Theory And Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, The Duty To Disclose, And Fraud, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The author begins by responding to Coleman's rational choice approach to choosing default rules. In part I, he applies the expanded analysis of contractual consent and default rules that he had recently presented elsewhere to explain how rational bargaining, hypothetical consent, and actual consent figure in the determination of contractual default rules. Whereas Coleman advocates the centrality of rational bargaining analysis to this determination, the author explains why rational bargaining theory's role must be subsidiary to that of consent.
The author then turns his attention to Coleman's appraisal of contracting parties' duty to disclose information concerning the resources that are …