Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Digital Commons Network

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 13 of 13

Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network

Academic Freedom And Professorial Speech In The Post-Garcetti World, Oren R. Griffin Nov 2013

Academic Freedom And Professorial Speech In The Post-Garcetti World, Oren R. Griffin

Seattle University Law Review

Academic freedom, a coveted feature of higher education, is the concept that faculty should be free to perform their essential functions as professors and scholars without the threat of retaliation or undue administrative influence. The central mission of an academic institution, teach-ing and research, is well served by academic freedom that allows the faculty to conduct its work in the absence of censorship or coercion. In support of this proposition, courts have long held that academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, granting professors and faculty members cherished protections regarding academic speech. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the …


Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow Apr 2013

Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow

John Barlow

No abstract provided.


Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow Apr 2013

Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow

John Barlow

No abstract provided.


Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow Apr 2013

Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow

John Barlow

No abstract provided.


Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow Apr 2013

Unringing The Bell: The Government Speech Doctrine And Publicly-Funded Art, John Barlow

John Barlow

No abstract provided.


The First Amendment Right To Bare All: How Should Courts Apply The Secondary Effects Doctrine To Strip Bars And Other Sexually Oriented Businesses?, Andrew L. Arons Feb 2013

The First Amendment Right To Bare All: How Should Courts Apply The Secondary Effects Doctrine To Strip Bars And Other Sexually Oriented Businesses?, Andrew L. Arons

Andrew L Arons

The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a deferential First Amendment Doctrine that can be used to uphold laws that target speakers on the basis of the content of their speech. This so-called “secondary effects” doctrine relies on a fictional premise: state and local laws that target certain forms of speech are actually aimed at the adverse secondary effects of the speech. The doctrine supposedly applies to any form of speech that produces secondary effects. It also theoretically permits targeted speakers to challenge the constitutionality of such laws by disproving the existence of secondary effects. Nevertheless, lower courts have impliedly limited …


Justice Kennedy’S “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, And The Struggle For Marriage Equality, Lawrence C. Levine Jan 2013

Justice Kennedy’S “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, And The Struggle For Marriage Equality, Lawrence C. Levine

McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.


Justice Kennedy’S “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, And The Struggle For Marriage Equality, Lawrence C. Levine Jan 2013

Justice Kennedy’S “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, And The Struggle For Marriage Equality, Lawrence C. Levine

McGeorge Law Review

No abstract provided.


Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin Jan 2013

Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of an area of increasing importance – algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing substantive communications. We could of course adopt …


A Balanced Budget Amendment Fit For The Constitution: The Elimination Of Partisanship And Substantive Provisions, 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 583 (2013), Shane Nichols Jan 2013

A Balanced Budget Amendment Fit For The Constitution: The Elimination Of Partisanship And Substantive Provisions, 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 583 (2013), Shane Nichols

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


“V.I.P” Videographer Intimidation Protection: How The Government Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape The Police, David Murphy Jan 2013

“V.I.P” Videographer Intimidation Protection: How The Government Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape The Police, David Murphy

Student Works

No abstract provided.


Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher Jan 2013

Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

A great deal of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But courts and scholars have done little to consider whether or why such meaningless speech, like nonrepresentational art, falls within “the freedom of speech.” If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from sound and expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for nonsense is complicated. And because nonsense is so common, the case is also important — artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the outcome.

This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship between …


Emerging Technologies And Dwindling Speech, Jorge R. Roig Dec 2012

Emerging Technologies And Dwindling Speech, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

Inspired in part by the recent holding in Bland v. Roberts that the use of the “Like” feature in Facebook is not covered by the Free Speech Clause, this article makes a brief foray into the approach that courts have taken in the recent past towards questions of First Amendment coverage in the context of emerging technologies. Specifically, this article will take a closer look at how courts have dealt with the issue of functionality in the context of First Amendment coverage of computer source code. The analysis of this and other recent experiences, when put in a larger context, …