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Bridging The Analogy Gap: The Internet, The Printing Press And Freedom Of Speech, Jonathan Wallace, Michael Green Jan 1997

Bridging The Analogy Gap: The Internet, The Printing Press And Freedom Of Speech, Jonathan Wallace, Michael Green

Seattle University Law Review

The Supreme Court will bring the highest degree of clarity to the Internet freedom of speech debate if, in ACLU v. Reno, it sets forth the operative metaphor for freedom of speech and applies the metaphor in conjunction with an appropriate analogy for the technology.Part I of this Article discusses judicial decision-making tools with an emphasis on the use of analogy and the importance of applying legal precedents in a manner which is consistent and logical. Part I also discusses the use of metaphor in judicial decisionmaking and illustrates how operative metaphors for free speech have served to provide …


Leaving Well Enough Alone—Why The "Would Have" Standard Works Well For Determining Pretext Stops In Washington State: A Critical Analysis Of The Whren Decision, Kelly Montgomery Jan 1997

Leaving Well Enough Alone—Why The "Would Have" Standard Works Well For Determining Pretext Stops In Washington State: A Critical Analysis Of The Whren Decision, Kelly Montgomery

Seattle University Law Review

This Note argues that the "could have" standard makes a mockery of the probable cause protections provided by the Fourth Amendment and that the Washington courts should not adopt that standard. Instead, because Washington courts have traditionally held that Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington Constitution provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the Washington courts should continue to use the "would have" standard to determine whether a stop is pretextual under Article 1, Section 7.11. Part II of this Note briefly describes the applicable search and seizure doctrine and tracks the split in the …


Dropping Anchor: Defining A Search In Compliance With Article I, Section 7 Of The Washington State Constitution, Daniel J. Clark Jan 1997

Dropping Anchor: Defining A Search In Compliance With Article I, Section 7 Of The Washington State Constitution, Daniel J. Clark

Seattle University Law Review

Section II examines State v. Myrick itself, including the Washington Supreme Court's path that led to that decision, the facts of the case, its reasoning, and its holding. Section III discusses the reaction to and effects of Myrick, including the seemingly disingenuous and inconsistent cases that have followed Myrick. Section IV outlines a proposal that more precisely defines a search in Washington, discussing the sources of the proposed test, examining how it would help guide Washington courts, and explaining which cases would be decided differently using the proposed standard.


Affirmative Action California Style—Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding A Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because Of Race And Sex, L. Darnell Weeden Jan 1997

Affirmative Action California Style—Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding A Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because Of Race And Sex, L. Darnell Weeden

Seattle University Law Review

This Article will analyze the Equal Protection Clause in relation to the government's ability to classify and will discuss whether race is a prohibited classification. The author will closely critique the case of Coalition For Economic Equity v. Wilson, which challenges the constitutionality of Proposition 209 because of its political burdens on interests important to racial minorities and women. The author will argue that Proposition 209's Equal Protection standard should be illicit state action rather than political burdens. Finally, the author will critique the Wilson court's understanding of violations of the Equal Protection Clause. This understanding is rejected here …