Digital Commons Network^™

The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …

Whole Woman’S Health V. Hellerstedt, Kelly Lynn Claxton

Ohio Northern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Fisher V. University Of Texas At Austin, Christopher M. Calpin

Ohio Northern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dying Constitutionalism And The Fourteenth Amendment, Ernest A. Young

Marquette Law Review

None

Clarifying The Scope Of The Self-Incrimination Clause: City Of Hays V. Vogt, Samantha Ruben

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Three months after oral arguments, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in City of Hays v. Vogt as improvidently granted. The question in Vogt was whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is violated when incriminating statements are used at a probable cause hearing, as opposed to a criminal trial. As a result of the “DIG,” the Court left a circuit split unresolved surrounding the meaning of a “criminal case” within the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.

This note argues that the Supreme Court should not have dismissed Vogt and should have decided that the Fifth Amendment right against …

When Big Brother Becomes “Big Father”: Examining The Continued Use Of Parens Patriae In State Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, Emily R. Mowry

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The U.S. Constitution grants American citizens numerous Due Process rights; but, historically, the Supreme Court declined to extend these Due Process rights to children. Initially, common-law courts treated child offenders over the age of seven in the same manner as adult criminals. At the start of the 20th century, though, juvenile reformers assisted in creating unique juvenile courts that used the parens patriae doctrine and viewed children as delinquent youths in need of judicial parental guidance rather than punishment. Later, starting in 1967, the Supreme Court released multiple opinions extending certain constitutional Due Process rights to children in juvenile delinquency …

Judges Do It Better: Why Judges Can (And Should) Decide Life Or Death, Andrew R. Ford

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Following its decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United States has attempted to standardize procedures that states use to subject offenders to the ultimate penalty. In practice, this attempt at standardization has divided capital sentencing into two distinct parts: the death eligibility decision and the death selection decision. The eligibility decision addresses whether the sentencer may impose the death penalty, while the selection decision determines who among that limited subset of eligible offenders is sentenced to death. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court held for the first time that the Sixth Amendment right to …