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Equal Citizenship And The Individual Right To Vote, Jospeh Fishkin

Indiana Law Journal

An emerging consensus among election law scholars urges courts to break out of “the stagnant discourse of individual rights and competing state interests” and instead adopt a jurisprudence of “structural” democratic values that sidelines individual rights. This structuralist approach won out in the great “rightsstructure” debate in election law, and came to dominate the field, during a period in which the main controversies—vote dilution, gerrymandering, ballot access, campaign finance—were all ones in which the structuralist move was illuminating. However, structuralism is now causing both scholars and courts to evaluate the new wave of vote denial controversies, over such issues as …

The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, And The Fourth Amendment, Thomas K. Clancy

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Boundaries Of Privacy Harm, M. Ryan Calo

Indiana Law Journal

Just as a burn is an injury caused by heat, so is privacy harm a unique injury with specific boundaries and characteristics. This Essay describes privacy harm as falling into two related categories. The subjective category of privacy harm is the perception of unwanted observation. This category describes unwelcome mental states—anxiety, embarrassment, fear—that stem from the belief that one is being watched or monitored. Examples of subjective privacy harms include everything from a landlord eavesdropping on his tenants to generalized government surveillance.

The objective category of privacy harm is the unanticipated or coerced use of information concerning a person against …

Retail Rebellion And The Second Amendment, Darrell A. H. Miller

Indiana Law Journal

When, if ever, is there a Second Amendment right to kill a cop? This piece seeks to answer that question. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment codifies a natural right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense. That right to self-defense extends to both private and public threats, including self-defense against agents of a tyrannical government. Moreover, the right is individual. Individuals―not just communities―have the right to protect themselves from public violence. Individuals―not just militias―have the right to defend themselves against tyranny. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court went further, …

Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics And Legal Doctrine In The Melting Pot, D. James Greiner

Indiana Law Journal

Racial bloc voting is the central concept in judicial regulation of redistricting. For the past several decades, the definition and proof of this concept have depended on two premises: that polities can be conceptualized in biracial terms and that nearly perfect information on voting patterns can be inexpensively obtained from simple statistical methods. In fact, however, neither premise has been true for some time, as the nation has become multiracial and allegations have increased that Caucasians vote less monolithically than before, with both assertions imposing severe stress on the simple statistical methods previously used to assess voting patterns. In this …

First Amendment Investigations And The Inescapable Pragmatism Of The Common Law Of Free Speech, Lawrence Rosenthal

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Costs Of Heightened Pleading, Alexander A. Reinert

Indiana Law Journal

In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court announced its commitment to a liberal pleading regime in federal civil cases, and for decades thereafter was steadfast in resisting ad hoc heightened pleading rules adopted by lower courts. Thus, from 1957 until a few years ago, most litigants could count on surviving a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim so long as their pleading provided some minimal notice to the defendant of the nature of their claim. Enter Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Iqbal and Twombly, by many accounts, two-stepped the Court from …

Signing Unconstitutional Laws, William Baude

Indiana Law Journal

It has become fairly common for Presidents to sign laws that they think are unconstitutional, at least in part. Some scholars argue that this is unconstitutional. Others defend it, but on pragmatic grounds, as if one cannot afford to be a constitutional formalist in today’s government.

Both sides are wrong. In a wide range of cases, there is nothing wrong with signing unconstitutional laws. Indeed, it is required. Yet the President must exercise this power responsibly. He must have other constitutional duties that justify signing the remainder of the bill into law, and he must be prepared to use his …