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Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests And Searches In The Context Of Qualified Immunity, Erwin Chemerinsky, Karen M. Blum Jun 2017

Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests And Searches In The Context Of Qualified Immunity, Erwin Chemerinsky, Karen M. Blum

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.


Race And The Decision To Detain A Suspect, Sheri Johnson Dec 2014

Race And The Decision To Detain A Suspect, Sheri Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.


The Qualitative Dimension Of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness", Sherry F. Colb Dec 2014

The Qualitative Dimension Of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness", Sherry F. Colb

Sherry Colb

Supreme Court doctrine protects two seemingly distinct kinds of interests under the heading of privacy rights: one "substantive," the other "procedural." The Fourth Amendment guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures" has been generally interpreted to protect procedural privacy. Searches are typically defined as governmental inspections of activities and locations in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy from observation. In the typical case, this reasonable expectation of privacy may be breached only where the government has acquired a quantitatively substantial objective basis for believing that the search would uncover evidence of a crime. Substantive privacy rights have not …


Innocence, Privacy, And Targeting In Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, Sherry F. Colb Dec 2014

Innocence, Privacy, And Targeting In Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, Sherry F. Colb

Sherry Colb

No abstract provided.


Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion And Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, Sherry F. Colb Dec 2014

Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion And Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, Sherry F. Colb

Sherry Colb

No abstract provided.


Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation From The October 2006 Term, Martin Schwartz Jun 2014

Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation From The October 2006 Term, Martin Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.


Stop Terry : Reasonable Suspicion, Race, And A Proposal To Limit Terry Stops, Renée M. Hutchins Feb 2014

Stop Terry : Reasonable Suspicion, Race, And A Proposal To Limit Terry Stops, Renée M. Hutchins

Renée M. Hutchins

The Terry doctrine, which grants a police officer the authority to stop and frisk based on his or her reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, was created by the Supreme Court at a time when the nation con- fronted a particular moment of violent racial strife. Since Terry was decided, the Supreme Court has continued to expand the reach of the doctrine—which opened the door for potential abuse. Existing data is increasingly proving that the loosening of constitutional standards is causing substantial harms to people of color nationwide. This article joins the existing scholarly discussion surrounding this decision to suggest …


Warrant Requirement -- The Burger Court Approach, Robert Bloom Oct 2013

Warrant Requirement -- The Burger Court Approach, Robert Bloom

Robert Bloom

No abstract provided.


The Supreme Court And Its Purported Preference For Search Warrants, Robert M. Bloom Oct 2013

The Supreme Court And Its Purported Preference For Search Warrants, Robert M. Bloom

Robert Bloom

No abstract provided.


Warrant Requirement -- The Burger Court Approach, Robert M. Bloom Oct 2011

Warrant Requirement -- The Burger Court Approach, Robert M. Bloom

Robert M. Bloom

No abstract provided.


The Supreme Court And Its Purported Preference For Search Warrants, Robert M. Bloom Oct 2011

The Supreme Court And Its Purported Preference For Search Warrants, Robert M. Bloom

Robert M. Bloom

No abstract provided.


The Modern History Of Probable Cause, Wesley Oliver Dec 2010

The Modern History Of Probable Cause, Wesley Oliver

Wesley M Oliver

It is frequently assumed that probable cause, roughly as we understand it today, has, since time immemorial, been the standard allowing an officer to search or arrest. The reality is that probable cause has change a lot since the Bill of Rights was drafted. In the mid-nineteenth century, probable cause was no more than a pleading requirement in criminal cases -- and never has been more than a pleading requirement in criminal cases. Victims of crimes alone were able to seek arrest or search warrants by swearing that they had suffered an injury and that they had probable cause to …


Cell Phone Location Data And The Fourth Amendment: A Question Of Law, Not Fact, Susan Freiwald Dec 2010

Cell Phone Location Data And The Fourth Amendment: A Question Of Law, Not Fact, Susan Freiwald

Susan Freiwald

In a significant ruling in the fall of 2010, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government’s claim that it could compel cell phone service providers to disclose customer records that indicate the cell towers with which a cell phone has communicated (cell phone location information or CSLI) without obtaining a warrant based on probable cause. In a break with past decisions, the court rejected application of a “third party rule,” under which cell phone users are seen to assume the risk that their providers will disclose location data without the protections of a warrant requirement. The court, however, …


Probability, Probable Cause, And The Law Of Unintended Consequences, Lawrence Rosenthal Dec 2008

Probability, Probable Cause, And The Law Of Unintended Consequences, Lawrence Rosenthal

Lawrence Rosenthal

This brief essay responds to Max Minzer's article "Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause." The essay supports Professor Minzer's proposal for the use of empirical evidence of the success of a given investigating officer or investigative technique in assessing the existence of probable cause to search or seize, but offers a caveat. If an officer's "hit rate" becomes central to Fourth Amendment analysis, there is a serious danger of overdeterrence which, in turn, could lead to a dangerous escalation in violent crime. The essay offers some proposals for minimizing the risk of overdeterrence in an empirically-based regime of probable cause.