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Between Law And Religion: Procedural Challenges To Religious Arbitration Awards (Video), Michael Helfand Apr 2013

Between Law And Religion: Procedural Challenges To Religious Arbitration Awards (Video), Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

No abstract provided.


Testimony Before The U.S. Commission On Civil Rights, Briefing On Peaceful Coexistence: Reconciling Non-Discrimination Principles With Civil Liberties, Michael A. Helfand Mar 2013

Testimony Before The U.S. Commission On Civil Rights, Briefing On Peaceful Coexistence: Reconciling Non-Discrimination Principles With Civil Liberties, Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

No abstract provided.


Symposium Introduction: The Competing Claims Of Law And Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? , Robert F. Cochran Jr., Michael A. Helfand Feb 2013

Symposium Introduction: The Competing Claims Of Law And Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? , Robert F. Cochran Jr., Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

No abstract provided.


Religion's Wise Embrace Of Commerce, Michael Helfand Feb 2013

Religion's Wise Embrace Of Commerce, Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

No abstract provided.


A Liberalism Of Sincerity: The Role Of Religion In The Public Square, Michael Helfand Dec 2012

A Liberalism Of Sincerity: The Role Of Religion In The Public Square, Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

This article considers the extent to which the liberal nation-state ought to accommodate religious practices that contravene state law and to incorporate religious discourse into public debate. To address these questions, the article develops a liberalism of sincerity based on John Locke’s theory of toleration. On such an account, liberalism imposes a duty of sincerity to prevent individuals from consenting to a regime that exercises control over matters of core concern such as faith, religion, and conscience. Liberal theory grounds the legitimacy of the state in the consent of the governed, but consenting to an intolerant regime is illegitimate because …


What Is A "Church"?: Implied Consent And The Contraception Mandate, Michael Helfand Dec 2012

What Is A "Church"?: Implied Consent And The Contraception Mandate, Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

This Article considers the “religious employer” exception to the “contraception mandate” – that is, the “preventative care” requirements announced by Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This exception has triggered significant litigation with a variety of employers claiming that they have been excluding from the “religious employer” classification in violation of both the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In considering these claims, this Article applies an “implied consent” framework to these cases, which grounds the authority of religious institutions in the presumed consent of their members. On such …


Religion's Footnote Four: Church Autonomy As Arbitration, Michael A. Helfand Dec 2012

Religion's Footnote Four: Church Autonomy As Arbitration, Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

While the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC has been hailed as an unequivocal victory for religious liberty, the Court’s holding in footnote four – that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar – undermines decades of conventional thinking about the relationship between church and state. For some time, a wide range of scholars had conceptualized the relationship between religious institutions and civil courts as “jurisdictional” – that is, scholars converged on the view that the religion clauses deprived courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over religious claims. In turn, courts could not adjudicate religious disputes …


Litigating Religion, Michael A. Helfand Dec 2012

Litigating Religion, Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

This article considers how parties should resolve disputes that turn on religious doctrine and practice – that is, how people should litigate religion. Under current constitutional doctrine, litigating religion is generally the task of two types of religious institutions: first, religious arbitration tribunals, whose decisions are protected by arbitration doctrine, and religious courts, whose decision are protected by the religion clauses. Such institutions have been thrust into playing this role largely because the religion clauses are currently understood to prohibit courts from resolving religious questions – that is, the “religious question” doctrine is currently understood to prohibit courts from litigating …