Digital Commons Network^™

Judge James A. Wynn, Originalism, And The Juridical/Judicial Role, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium poses a provocative question: Should judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political branches as a means of giving voice to the “will of the people”? The inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs of the political branches—a connection we argue is frayed, at best, in the current political context.

In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of our political system—ranging from representational distortions in federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan polarization and the behavior of elected officials—call into question whether political outcomes reliably …

Judges As Superheroes: The Danger Of Confusing Constitutional Decisions With Cosmic Battles, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, And The Originalism Debate, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to amend. In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national government, and for 230 years the national government has operated under that framework even as conditions have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations. The framework has survived in no small part because government institutions have themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions, informed by the realities of governance. Courts, the political branches, and academic commentators commonly give weight to such …

Bans, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

In the universe of legal restrictions subject to judicial review, those characterized as fully denying some aspect of a constitutional right—bans—are often subject to per se rules of invalidity. Whether the subject of the restriction is a medium of expression, the valuable use of property, or a class of weapons, courts in such cases will often short-circuit the standard doctrinal machinery and strike down the law, even if it might have survived heightened scrutiny. Identifying laws as bans can thus provide an end run around the tiers of scrutiny and other familiar forms of means-ends analysis.

And yet it is …

Doing Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

It is common for courts, the political branches, and academic commentators to look to historical governmental practices when interpreting the separation of powers. There has been relatively little attention, however, to the proper methodology for invoking such “historical gloss.” This Essay contends that, in order to gain traction on the methodological questions, we need to begin by considering the potential justifications for crediting gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is this Essay’s principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: deference to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance interests. As …

What Judges Say And Do In Deciding National Security Cases: The Example Of The State Secrets Privilege, Anthony John Trenga

Duke Law Master of Judicial Studies Theses

From the criminal trial of Aaron Burr on charges of treason to modern-day litigation involving the CIA, the state secrets privilege presents a thorny issue for federal judges. Judge Trenga examines the legal issues at the heart of this privilege—separation of powers, non-justiciability, evidentiary privilege, national security interests, and military secrets—and the two primary doctrinal tracks judges invoke. Then, based on interviews with thirty-one federal judges, Judge Trenga offers insights into how judges think about applying the state secrets privilege to sensitive material.

Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutionalism Outside The Courts, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is a chapter to be included in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on the U.S. Constitution. Using the actions of Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus during the Little Rock crisis of 1957 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Cooper v. Aaron as a lens, it explores constitutional interpretation and enforcement by extrajudicial institutions. I explore the critique of Cooper’s notion of judicial supremacy by departmentalists like Walter Murphy, empirical scholars skeptical of judicial efficacy like Gerald Rosenberg, and popular constitutionalists like Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet. I also consider four distinct institutional forms of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and …

Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time through political-branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance. Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how historical practice can inform constitutional understandings …

The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And Legal Constraint, Curtis A. Bradley, Trevor W. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

The scope of the President’s legal authority is determined in part by historical practice. This Essay aims to better understand how such practice-based law might operate as a constraint on the presidency. Some scholars have suggested that presidential authority has become “unbounded” by law, and is now governed only or primarily by politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in any systematic or reliable fashion. Skepticism about law’s potential to constrain in this context is heightened by the customary nature of much of what …

Sorrell V. Ims Health And The End Of The Constitutional Double Standard, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Conflicted Assumptions Of Modern Constitutional Law, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

Contribution to Symposium - The Nature of Judicial Authority: A Reflection on Philip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Duty

Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, And The Federalist Revival After Gonzales V. Raich, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf

Faculty Scholarship

Although critics of judicial review sometimes call for making the entire Constitution nonjusticiable, many familiar norms of constitutional law state what we call "existence conditions" that are necessarily enforced by judicial actors charged with the responsibility of applying, and thus as a preliminary step, identifying, propositions of sub-constitutional law such as statutes. Article I, Section 7, which sets forth the procedures by which a bill becomes a law, is an example: a putative law that did not go through the Article I, Section 7 process and does not satisfy an alternative test for legal validity (such as the treaty-making provision …

Piercing The Veil: William J. Brennan's Account Of Regents Of The University Of California V. Bakke, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …

Comments On Standards Of Judicial Review, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Apartheid And The South African Judiciary, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Notes On A Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes Of Change, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

With the approach of the Bill of Rights bicentennial, this paper takes the cause for celebration as an equally important occasion for critique. This work argues that the most distinguishing aspects of our Constitution are not the Bill of Rights, federalism, and separation of powers, but rather the availability of judicial review, the political insulation of federal judges, and the limited mechanisms available for constitutional change.

A Political And Constitutional Review Of United States V. Nixon, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This comparison of United States v. Nixon and the Pentagon Papers case finds the greatest similarity and significance shared by the two cases was the anti-climactic nature of their conclusions. While both cases concerned constitutional questions of the highest order, centered around the scope of the executive power, both cases were drawn on such narrow grounds that there was hardly any effect on constitutional law doctrine.